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I. INTRODUCTION 
For human rights advocates, the present era is a time of reflection. This is 
partly because, in several countries, authoritarian patterns old and new are 
restricting scope for dissent and contestation—a trend that increases the need 
but reduces the space for human rights strategies.1 At a deeper level, however, 
wide-ranging critiques over the past two decades have questioned the viability 
of human rights as a vehicle for emancipatory action. 
Critiques of rights are not new and have taken different forms.2 But grow-
ing public concerns about economic inequality have sparked more recent 
commentary about the role human rights may have played in abetting and even 
sustaining the perceived ills of global economic ordering—including poverty, 
dispossession and exploitation.3 The historical overlap, since the 1970s, be-
tween the rise to prominence of human rights in public discourse and mobili-
zation on the one hand, and the deepening of neoliberal economic configura-
tions on the other, has sustained these debates.4 
The new wave of critique has emerged at a time when many social move-
ments mobilize human rights to frame their action in pursuit of social justice, 
from challenging land grabbing and labor exploitation, to promoting fairer 
terms of inclusion in global value chains. Over time, the critique could foster 
shifts in the discursive practices that underpin social justice advocacy. But the 
present coexistence of a new surge in the critique of rights on the one hand, 
and of mobilizing rights in social struggles on the other, raises questions about 
the relation between critical theory and emancipatory action.5 
 
 1 Philip Alston, Human Rights Under Siege, 14 SUR INT’L J. ON HUM. RTS. 267, 268 
(2017). 
 2 See, e.g., RADHA D’SOUZA, WHAT’S WRONG WITH RIGHTS? SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, LAW 
AND LIBERAL IMAGINATIONS xiv (2018); Wendy Brown, “The Most We Can Hope For 
. . .”: Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism, 103 S. ATLANTIC Q. 451 (2004); David 
Kennedy, International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 101 (2002); see also Ben Golder, Beyond Redemption? Problematising the Critique 
of Human Rights in Contemporary International Legal Thought, 2 LONDON REV. OF INT’L 
L. 77, 80 (providing a “critique of the critique”). 
 3 For diverse positions on this debate, see, e.g., JOHN LINARELLI, MARGON SALOMON & 
MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNAJAH, THE MISERY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
CONFRONTATIONS WITH INJUSTICE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2018); SAMUEL MOYN, NOT 
ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD (2018); Susan Marks, Four Human 
Rights Myths (LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 10/2012, 2012), https://ssrn.com/abst 
ract=2150155. 
 4 MOYN, supra note 3. 
 5 Paul O’Connell, On the Human Rights Question, 40 HUM. RTS. Q. 962, 963 (2018) 
(“This disjuncture—between critical theory and critical practice—raises . . . questions 
about the relationship between ideas and social movements, law and struggles to bring 
about social change, and . . . about the role of human rights in emancipatory politics.”); see 
also Zachary Manfredi, Recent Histories and Uncertain Futures: Contemporary Critiques 
of International Human Rights and Humanitarianism, 22 QUI PARLE 3 (2013). 
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International law has long provided fertile ground for the interplay of hu-
man rights and social justice. International tribunals have adjudicated on hu-
man rights claims that were informed by a concern for social justice, for ex-
ample, with regards to the litigation that indigenous peoples initiated to defend 
or reclaim their ancestral lands.6 Similarly, the international bodies responsi-
ble for interpreting human rights treaties have had to grapple with social jus-
tice issues in the elaboration of their jurisprudence, and the involvement of 
activists in the development of new international human rights instruments 
has become an increasingly significant occurrence. 
Outside the realm of institutionalized proceedings, public advocacy in 
wide-ranging socio-political arenas has often invoked the terms, and the au-
thority, of international human rights treaties to advance social justice goals.7 
This role of international law in the interface between human rights and social 
justice means that the recent surge in the critique of rights raises questions 
about the theory and practice of international law, and ultimately about the 
emancipatory potential of international law itself.   
This Article reflects on the place of human rights, particularly international 
human rights law, in strategies to advance social justice. It argues that, while 
some critique takes aim at an encompassing human rights “project,” the con-
tested nature of human rights calls for more granular analyses that consider 
the diverse constellations of actors, agendas, arenas, and approaches connect-
ing human rights to social justice. And while much public debate has focused 
on institutionalized human rights actors and frameworks, the article identifies 
human rights’ primary emancipatory promise in the agency of the social ac-
tors—indigenous peoples, agrarian movements, trade unions, non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs), grassroots groups—that have appropriated and 
in some cases reconfigured human rights from the bottom up. 
Examples include international litigation to validate new interpretations of 
long-recognized rights; public campaigning for new international instruments 
to shift the contours of human rights; and invoking internationally recognized 
rights to change public discourses in local to global policy arenas. This re-
centring of the discussion around how social actors mobilize internationally 
recognized human rights is part of a wider shift in the way international law 
is conceived of, not just as a practice located in the global centers of 
 
 6 See, e.g., Indigenous Communities of the Xingu River Basin, Pará, Brazil, PM 382/10, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. (Apr. 1, 2011) (requiring consultations that are “culturally in-
formed,” among other social justice-based concerns). 
 7 Sylvia Arzey & Luke McNamara, Invoking International Human Rights Law in a 
“Rights-Free Zone”: Indigenous Justice Campaigns in Australia, 33 HUM. RTS. Q. 733, 
735 (2011) (analyzing the efficacy of the invocation of human rights in aboriginal public 
advocacy in Australia). 
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international diplomacy, but as a phenomenon that is both experienced and to 
some extent shaped at the grassroots as well.8 
The remainder of the Article is structured as follows. Section II briefly 
outlines the relation between human rights and social justice, cursorily re-
viewing—and critically engaging with—some of the main strands of the re-
cent critique of rights. Section II also articulates the case for disaggregating 
the interface between human rights and social justice in the light of two inter-
linked but distinctive modes of human rights advocacy: “reactive” strategies, 
whereby recourse to existing human rights concepts and instruments responds 
to specific instances or patterns of social injustice; and “constitutive” strate-
gies, whereby advocacy aims for a more foundationally normative reconfigu-
ration of human rights themselves, in pursuit of longer-term social justice 
goals. 
Sections III and IV examine two case studies of “reactive” and “constitu-
tive” forms of rights-claiming to distil qualitative insights on the place of hu-
man rights in social justice strategies. While much debate about the relation 
between human rights and social justice has been primarily grounded in Eu-
ropean and North American experiences, the analysis deliberately focuses on 
experiences of advocacy conducted by actors that are located, at least in part, 
in the “global South,” often through alliances that cut across conventional 
North-South divides, and largely outside the mainstream “human rights move-
ment,” in order to facilitate fuller consideration of the geographic and ideo-
logical diversity of human rights activism. 
The first case study, discussed in Section III, concerns the “reactive” use 
of human rights in indigenous peoples’ struggles to challenge the award of 
commercial natural resource concessions in their ancestral territories. This 
case study relies particularly heavily on human rights litigation and jurispru-
dential developments that occurred within the regional human rights systems 
of Africa and the Americas. The second case study (Section IV) considers the 
use of human rights in “constitutive” strategies to transform the economic par-
adigm that underpins the global food system. This part focuses on the 
longstanding and ultimately successful advocacy of international agrarian 
movements for the adoption, by the United Nations General Assembly, of the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Work-
ing in Rural Areas.9 
Each of the two case studies is examined though a common socio-legal 
prism that interrogates: i) the political and juridical terrain from which the 
 
 8 See generally LUIS ESLAVA, LOCAL SPACE, GLOBAL LIFE: THE EVERYDAY OPERATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (2015); see also Lorenzo Cotula, Land, Prop-
erty and Sovereignty in International Law, 25 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 219 (2017); 
Sarah Mason-Case, On Being Companions and Strangers: Lawyers and the Production of 
International Climate Law, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 625 (2019). 
 9 G.A. Res. 73/165, U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Work-
ing in Rural Areas (Dec. 17, 2018). 
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relevant rights-claiming practices emerged; ii) any normative reconfigurations 
the rights-claiming led to, whether in the form of jurisprudential developments 
or international (soft) law making; and iii) whether and how rights-claiming 
ultimately achieved the changes sought in social, political, and economic tra-
jectories. 
While extremely diverse in their actors, agendas, arenas and approaches, 
the two case studies illustrate the ways in which social actors have wielded 
human rights to reclaim land, resources and territories, to renegotiate control 
over national development pathways, and to challenge aspects of global eco-
nomic ordering. These aspects range from the “extractivist” paradigm 
whereby large-scale agribusiness, mining, petroleum and hydro projects are 
converting indigenous lands to commodity extraction, all the way to control 
over the means of production and value chain relations in the context of global 
food systems. 
The conclusion (Section V) develops cross-cutting reflections based on the 
findings of the two case studies, comparing the operation of reactive and con-
stitutive modes, and identifying areas for cross-fertilization between the two. 
The reflections highlight the inherent limitations of mobilizing human rights 
concepts that are ultimately implicated with dominant economic and political 
structures. But they also point to conscious efforts to appropriate, and to some 
extent reconfigure, human rights in social struggles. The findings suggest that, 
while critiques of rights identify real problems, there is a need to broaden cur-
rent debates, recognise the diversity of human rights forms, and more fully 
consider the practices of actors located outside the human rights mainstream. 
By shifting the focus from institutionalized human rights actors and frame-
works, to rights-claiming as a practice of contestation, it might become possi-
ble to ask different questions about whether and how human rights can sustain 
emancipatory action. 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: ANATOMY OF THE CRITIQUE—
AND OF ITS LIMITS 
A. On Social Justice 
 
The relation between human rights and social justice raises complex, mul-
tifaceted issues. This is partly because there are many conceptions of social 
justice, which have formed the object of variegated philosophical and political 
debates. Suffice it to say, for the purposes of this study, that a traditional em-
phasis in some social justice theories on the distribution of primarily material 
assets within or among national polities, and ultimately on the role of the state 
in national and international institutional configurations,10 has been 
 
 10 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF 
PEOPLES (2001). 
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complemented by ideas of justice that, to diverse extents: more explicitly con-
sider issues of recognition and representation;11 focus on human capabilities 
rather than material goods alone;12 and engage with the global and transna-
tional dimensions of political and economic ordering.13 
A framing that complements distributive issues with questions of identity 
and status (recognition), and of power and politics (representation),14 provides 
a useful point of departure for interrogating the place of international human 
rights law in social justice advocacy. Some recent scholarly debates have 
placed particular emphasis on the interface between human rights and eco-
nomic (in)equality.15 In effect, economic inequality reflects one subset of (pri-
marily distributive) issues within a broader social justice framing. While ine-
quality is more easily measurable and more directly resonates with public 
concerns currently debated in many polities, a more encompassing social jus-
tice framing can more effectively capture the broad spectrum of issues and 
relations that are associated with contemporary global ordering. 
 
B. The Critique in Outline 
 
Critiques of human rights are rooted in diverse normative perspectives, 
and it is impossible to do justice to them in the limited space available. By 
way of extreme synthesis, critics have developed both complementary and 
diverging accounts of what they see as the failure of human rights to confront 
injustice in socio-economic relations. 
Some critics have argued that deep-level commonalities exist between hu-
man rights and capitalist organization, particularly the emphasis that both 
place on individual autonomy, and on the agency of the individual as a polit-
ical and economic actor.16 These critics have noted that certain human rights 
are instrumental to, and inherently associated with, the functioning of domi-
nant economic models (for example, the role of the right to property in 
 
 11 See, e.g., NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION? A 
POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE (Joel Golb, James Ingram & Christiane Wilke 
trans., 2003). 
 12 See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 
2009). 
 13 See, e.g., THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2008); KOR-CHOR 
TAN, TOLERATION, DIVERSITY, AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (2000). 
 14 See Nancy Fraser, Hanne M. Dahl, Pauline Stolz, & Rasmus Willig, Recognition, Re-
distribution and Representation in Capitalist Global Society: An Interview with Nancy 
Fraser, 47 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 374 (2004). 
 15 See, e.g., MOYN, supra note 3. 
 16 For a discussion of these positions, see Zak Manfredi, Compatibility as Complicity? 
On Neoliberalism and Human Rights, Law and Political Economy, L. & POL. ECON. BLOG 
(May 28, 2018), https://lpeblog.org/2018/05/28/compatibility-as-complicity-on-neoliberal 
ism-and-human-rights/. 
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underpinning capitalist modes of production), and that public discourses have 
mobilized human rights to legitimize neoliberal economic reforms.17 In these 
accounts, human rights have, in effect, sustained the foundations of an unjust 
economic order.18 
Another body of critique has interrogated the perceived lack of ambition 
or effectiveness of human rights in confronting injustice, arguing that human 
rights “settled for preventing and mitigating deprivations but not changing the 
terms under which that suffering is not only made possible but is repro-
duced.”19 In these—admittedly diverse and not always converging—ac-
counts, human rights are potentially an emancipatory force, but they have 
failed to advance a truly transformative agenda that challenges unjust socio-
economic relations. Rather, they have been primarily interpreted as establish-
ing a minimum level of provision, a social safety net, to ensure that certain 
“basic needs” are met.20 
These arguments, articulated in recent academic and policy debates, need 
to be understood in the light of a longer term ideational stratification of cri-
tiques, including Marxist and post-Marxist perspectives, that have questioned 
the conceptual framing of human rights and its historical association with lib-
eral political theory21 and delineated human rights as involving a fundamen-
tally state-centric and conservative theory of change that can displace more 
radical “political and moral possibilities.”22 
The recent wave of critique also ties in with a longstanding body of em-
pirically grounded studies that pointed to the limitations of human rights in 
real-life social justice strategies. In some of these accounts, recourse to law 
inherently marginalizes the poor, because it shifts agency from social actors 
to legal professionals, in situations where the respective visions are often mis-
aligned.23 For example, some argue that disadvantaged groups may pragmat-
ically prefer political engagement and negotiation over human rights 
 
 17 Jessica Whyte, Powerless Companions or Fellow Travellers? Human Rights and the 
Neoliberal Assault on Post-Colonial Economic Justice, RADICAL PHIL. (June 2018), https:// 
www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/powerless-companions-or-fellow-travellers. On use 
of rights language to advance neoliberal reform, see QUINN SLOBODIAN, GLOBALISTS: THE 
END OF EMPIRE AND THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERALISM 120–45 (2018). 
 18 Whyte, supra note 17. 
 19 LINARELLI ET AL., supra note 3, at 228. 
 20 MOYN, supra note 3, at 162–73. 
 21 See D’SOUZA, supra note 3. 
 22 Jarrett Zignon, Maintaining the “Truth”: Performativity, Human Rights, and the Lim-
itations on Politics, 17 THEORY & EVENT (2014), https://muse.jhu.edu/article/553385. 
 23 Sheela Patel & Diana Mitlin, Reinterpreting the Rights-Based Approach: A Grass-
roots Perspective on Rights and Development, in RIGHTS-BASED APPROACHES TO 
DEVELOPMENT: EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL AND PITFALLS 107, 108 (Sam Hickey & Diana 
Mitlin eds., 2009). 
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strategies that are deemed to be inherently confrontational and capable of 
damaging important social relations.24 
Overall, critiques of rights command a substantial evidence base spanning 
different phases of contemporary human rights processes, both in relation to 
constitutional law in a variety of national contexts, and to the development 
and implementation of international human rights law. There is little doubt, 
for example, that many human rights concepts have historically emerged in 
connection with a political tradition that emphasises protecting individual 
rights against the exercise of state power, and that is coextensive with the ar-
chitecture of the global capitalist economy. 
This does not mean that human rights’ contemporary horizon is restricted 
to one political project or economic model. Developments in international law 
have taken human rights in diverse directions, including the explicit recogni-
tion of collective rights and of a range of economic, social and cultural 
rights.25 But in developing authoritative interpretations of these rights, some 
international jurisprudence has been reluctant to confront distributive issues 
or interrogate the foundations of economic ordering.26 
It is also the case that, when international human rights bodies have issued 
judgments or declarations, these instruments have often failed to deliver 
hoped-for results, partly owing to the limited effectiveness of international 
enforcement mechanisms in the face of determined state non-compliance. 
Empirical research shows that many human rights decisions have not been 
implemented, in full or in part, or the outcomes of their implementation have 
fallen short of expectations.27 
Further, questions of agency are a recurrent issue in human rights advo-
cacy, as the worldviews of social actors and their (often highly trained, urban-
based) legal advisors may not fully align, even more so when substantial ge-
ographical and cultural distances are at play, and as differentiated access to 
understanding and to action in the context of international legal proceedings 
 
 24 Id. 
 25 Margot E. Salomon, Why Should It Matter That Others Have More? Poverty, Inequal-
ity, and the Potential of International Human Rights Law, 37 REV. OF INT’L STUD. 2137, 
2155 (2011) (“Its tenets hold the possibility for an interpretation that better accommodates 
this collective venture of distributive justice; there is nothing inherent in its theoretical 
underpinnings on the nature of rights or obligations that limit the human rights project to 
sanctioning merely the bare bones of what it means to be human”). 
 26 Id. at 2137–55. 
 27 OPEN SOC’Y JUST. INITIATIVE, STRATEGIC LITIGATION IMPACTS: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ 
LAND RIGHTS (2017), https://www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads/8c45f0be-d3be-40d6-aae8 
-a0b046bf6511/slip-land-rights-20170620.pdf [hereinafter STRATEGIC LITIGATION 
IMPACTS]; Joel E. Correia, Adjudication and Its Aftereffects in Three Inter-American Court 
Cases Brought Against Paraguay: Indigenous Land Rights, 11 ERASMUS L. REV. 43, 43–
56 (2018). 
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can raise difficult challenges in ensuring the agenda genuinely proceeds from 
the bottom up.28 
 
C. Human Rights in 3D 
 
These considerations confirm the relevance of critically interrogating the 
viability of human rights concepts and practices, and of international human 
rights law, in transforming socio-economic relations. At the same time, re-
course to human rights in diverse social justice struggles raises questions 
about whether parts of the critique do not in fact rest on a reductionist view of 
human rights and downplay their evolving and contested nature.29 Beyond the 
apparent “common language of humanity” human rights have been claimed 
to provide,30 the human rights field involves radically different actors and are-
nas—from global law firms advising large corporations on business and hu-
man rights due diligence, to international agencies and the multilateral archi-
tecture of human rights diplomacy, through to grassroots lawyers working 
with disadvantaged people in often challenging and even dangerous environ-
ments. 
In this context, diverse human rights actors—from social activists to legal 
technocrats—have advanced different and possibly conflicting human rights 
conceptions and practices. While some advocates have espoused both human 
rights and neoliberal positions,31 and while human rights have been enlisted 
to support neoliberal reform,32 attempts to “hijack” human rights did not go 
unchallenged,33 and some radical scholars have reconceptualised human 
 
 28 See, e.g., Deval Desai, A Qui l’Homme Sauvage? The Text, Context, and Subtext of 
Agreements Between Mining Corporations and Indigenous Communities, in SOCIO-LEGAL 
APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: TEXT, CONTEXT, SUBTEXT 153–56 
(Amanda Perry-Kessaris ed., 2013). 
 29 See Julia Dehm, Rights as Potential Sites of Distributive Struggle, TOQUEVILLE21 
(July 10, 2018), https://tocqueville21.com/focus/rights-as-potential-sites-of-distributive-st 
ruggle/ (discussing the contested nature of human rights). 
 30 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, U.N. Secretary-General, Human Rights: The Common Lan-
guage of Humanity, Statement at the Opening of the World Conference on Human Rights 
(June 14, 1993), in WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS 5–21 (Digumarti Bhaskara 
Rao ed., 2003). 
 31 See, e.g., Whyte, supra note 17. 
 32 See, e.g., SLOBODIAN, supra note 17, at 134–42; Joseph Slaughter, Hijacking Human 
Rights: Neoliberalism, the New Historiography, and the End of the Third World, 40 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 735, 737–75 (2018). 
 33 Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: 
A Reply to Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 815–44 (2002); see also Andrew T. Lang, 
Re-Thinking Trade and Human Rights, BEPRESS LEGAL REPOSITORY (2006), https://law.be 
press.com/expresso/eps/1685 (discussing generally the relationship between human rights 
and trade law). 
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rights as an “ideology of struggle”34 that places human rights directly on a 
collision course with prevailing economic structures. 
Scholars from the global South have been particularly attentive to this di-
versity of human rights modes, distinguishing human rights as a technique of 
global governance from human rights as an “insurrectionary praxis” that, in 
giving voice to human suffering, destabilises and at times disrupts political 
and economic power,35 and have called for a “structural approach” to human 
rights that would fundamentally question international economic ordering.36 
Partly as a result of the interplay between diverse human rights conceptions, 
the past two decades have witnessed significant evolutions in discursive and 
jurisprudential human rights practices, which are not always fully reflected in 
critical analyses grounded in the historical origins or ideational matrices of 
human rights. 
In this evolving kaleidoscope of human rights forms, the penetration of 
hegemonic discourses into the fabric of human rights can coexist with human 
rights advocacy that challenges fundamental parameters of economic order-
ing. Far from “[making themselves] at home in a plutocratic world,”37 more 
radical activists have mobilized human rights to renegotiate socioeconomic 
relations. Examples include human rights organizations and alliances such as 
FIAN International and ESCR-Net,38 but also organizations that do not pri-
marily frame their institutional mandates in human rights terms, such as inter-
national agrarian movement La Via Campesina.39 
The public gaze has often focused on international NGOs based in Europe 
and North America, and on the institutions of multilateral diplomacy. How-
ever, a richer tapestry of human rights concepts and strategies emerges once 
fuller consideration is given to the ways in which social movements, including 
in the global South, have harnessed human rights to sustain their struggles. 
This includes not only confrontational strategies such as campaigning and lit-
igation, but also approaches based on dialogue and engagement, sometimes in 
spaces opened by the more adversarial action.40 
 
 34 ISSA G. SHIVJI, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 3 (1989). 
 35 UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 10–22 (2008). 
 36 See Julia Dehm, Highlighting Inequalities in the Histories of Human Rights: Contes-
tations over Justice, Needs and Rights in the 1970s, 31 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 871, 871–95 
(2018). 
 37 Samuel Moyn, How the Human Rights Movement Failed, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/23/opinion/human-rights-movement-failed.html. 
 38 See generally FIAN INT’L, https://www.fian.org/ (last visited Feb. 29, 2020); ESCR-
NET, https://www.escr-net.org/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2019). 
 39 The International Peasant’s Voice, LA VIA CAMPESINA, https://viacampesina/org/en/i 
nterantional-peasants-voice/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2019). 
 40 For an example of rights harnessing in a dialogue process, see Samuel Nguiffo, Victor 
Amougou Amougou, Brendan Schwartz & Lorenzo Cotula, Indigenous Peoples’ Land 
Rights in Cameroon: Progress to Date and Possible Futures, INT’L INST. ENV’T & DEV. 
(2017), http://pubs.iied.org/17448IIED/. 
484 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 48:473 
As political space shrinks in many places, activists have paid a high price 
for pursuing social justice goals through human rights. In 2017 alone, 209 
human rights activists defending land, environmental and indigenous peoples’ 
rights, particularly in the context of extractive industry and mega projects, 
were reportedly murdered, with many more reported to have suffered attacks, 
harassment, and intimidation.41 
Overall, these circumstances question the appropriateness of interrogating 
the relation between human rights and social justice in the light of a single 
“human rights project.” This single project would also encompass, for exam-
ple, neoliberals reading human rights as coextensive with a business-friendly 
climate, and hegemonic states justifying military intervention in the name of 
actual or perceived rights violations.42 Rather, the contested nature of human 
rights calls for fully considering the plurality of human rights theories and 
approaches, the internal tensions and contradictions, and the ways in which 
both concepts and practices are subject to contestation and evolution over 
time. 
 
D. Social Movements and Human Rights: “Reactive” and “Constitutive” 
Strategies 
 
The processes by which activists mobilize human rights to advance social 
justice are complex and manifold. There are several possible ways to classify 
these processes, and the boundaries of such classifications are typically 
blurred. One set of divides concerns the place of rights-claiming in advocacy 
strategies. In what can broadly be referred to as “reactive” modes, social ac-
tors have harnessed existing human rights norms and institutions to challenge 
specific instances or patterns of social injustice. While in “constitutive” 
modes, they have sought to shift the contours of human rights themselves, by 
advocating for the recognition of new rights or the reconfiguration of existing 
ones. 
On one level, reactive and constitutive modes seem to correlate to tradi-
tional conceptions of the separation of powers. Access to justice can feature 
prominently in reactive strategies. As a result, judges can play a prominent 
 
 41 FRONT LINE DEFS., ANNUAL REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS AT RISK IN 2017 
(2017), https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/sites/default/files/annual_report_digital.pdf; 
see also At What Cost? Irresponsible Business and the Murder of Land and Environment 
Defenders in 2017, GLOB. WITNESS (July 24, 2018), https://www.globalwitness.org/en/cam 
paigns/environmental-activists/at-what-cost/; Special Rapporteur on The Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples, Rep. of Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/39/17 (Aug. 10, 2018). 
 42 See generally ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003) (e.g., observing the increas-
ingly hegemonic nature of humanitarian interventions towards the end of the twentieth 
century). 
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role both in providing redress to the petitioners and in advancing “progres-
sive” interpretations of the law that can have repercussions beyond the dispute 
at stake. On the other hand, the foundational dimensions of constitutive strat-
egies would more closely resonate with the role of legislatures in processes of 
legal change—or, in an international context, with the role of states and inter-
national organizations in their treaty making or law development capacity. 
However, this apparent correlation is partial if not ultimately misleading, 
not least because rights-claiming is not confined to formal legal proceedings, 
whether judicial or legislative, and can instead be primarily located in social 
and discursive practices that are centred on collective action, public advocacy 
and social mobilization.43 In addition, border lines between reactive and con-
stitutive modes are often blurred in practice, and the two modes can substan-
tially overlap in real-life social struggles, which often mobilize elements of 
both, whether simultaneously or sequentially. 
That said, taken in their archetypical forms, the two modes represent dis-
tinctive approaches to the relation between human rights and social justice. 
The former possibly reflects a pragmatic, instrumentalist activation of human 
rights to challenge certain abuses; the latter embodies a more normative ap-
proach aimed at shifting the legal and ideational foundations of political and 
economic ordering. Examining the relation between human rights and social 
justice struggles through the prism of the two modes can add granularity, and 
possibly analytical clarity, to ongoing debates about the place of human rights 
in emancipatory strategies. 
What follows is a closer examination of the human rights and social justice 
interface considered in its reactive and constitutive modes, drawing on expe-
riences of indigenous and agrarian movements mobilizing human rights in 
their struggles over land, resources and territories. 
III. HUMAN RIGHTS IN “REACTIVE” MODE: THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE 
PROPERTY AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ LAND STRUGGLES 
A. Introductory Remarks 
 
In what this study refers to as reactive strategies, social actors invoke hu-
man rights to challenge specific instances or patterns of unjust socio-
 
 43 Arzey & McNamara, supra note 7, at 743 (noting the practice of invoking human 
rights law in political advocacy). 
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economic relations—from land grabbing44 to labor exploitation.45 Where ad-
vocacy mobilizes human rights that are formally recognized in applicable pos-
itive law, as it may be necessary to do in the context of international human 
rights litigation, activists may have to rely on concepts that are implicated 
with prevailing political and economic ordering, or otherwise not fully aligned 
with the social justice goals pursued, but that can be instrumental to pragmat-
ically advancing the cause. In addition, the emphasis on challenging egregious 
violations may be vulnerable, at least at first sight, to the critique that human 
rights can merely “humanize” socio-economic relations without fundamen-
tally transforming them.46 
However, advocacy in reactive modes often confronts distributive issues, 
for example concerning control over land and natural resources, with poten-
tially far-reaching implications for decision-making processes and for policy 
choices over development models and socio-political organization. Reactive 
advocacy also situates human rights as an evolving, contested space, with the 
normative content of rights being the outcome of struggle between different 
legal interpretations, and between different visions of society. The resulting 
reframing of issues and rights can sustain public advocacy well beyond the 
dispute directly at stake, blurring divides between reactive and constitutive 
modes. 
Take the right to property, a quintessentially liberal human right that has 
traditionally been associated with providing a foundation for the capitalist 
economy, with resisting redistribution, and with promoting a vision of devel-
opment based on individual ownership and so-called free markets.47 In many 
resource-dependent countries the intensification of natural resource extrac-
tion, as part of an “extractivist” development model that places the commod-
ification and exploitation of natural resources at the centre of economic 
growth strategies,48 has fostered widespread concerns about social and 
 
 44 See, e.g., FIAN INT’L, LAND GRABBING IN KENYA AND MOZAMBIQUE: A REPORT ON 
TWO RESEARCH MISSIONS AND A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF LAND GRABBING (2010), htt 
ps://www.fian.org/fileadmin/media/publications_2015/2010_4_Landgrabbing_Kenya_M 
ozambique_e.pdf. 
 45 See, e.g., Whoever Raises Their Head Suffers the Most: Workers’ Rights in Bangla-
desh’s Garment Factories, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/r 
eport/2015/04/22/whoever-raises-their-head-suffers-most/workers-rights-bangladeshs-gar 
ment#91c5bc; “Work Faster or Get Out”: Labor Rights Abuses in Cambodia’s Garment 
Industry, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/03/11 
work-faster-or-get-out/labor-rights-abuses-cambodias-garment-industry. 
 46 Umut Özsu, Grabbing Land Legally: A Marxist Analysis, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 215, 
215–33 (2019). 
 47 See generally FRANK K. UPHAM, THE GREAT PROPERTY FALLACY: THEORY, REALITY, 
AND GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2018) (deconstructing the perceived necessity 
of westernized property rights to economic development). 
 48 Linda Farthing & Nicole Fabricant, Introduction: Open Veins Revisited – Charting 
the Economic, Social, and Political Contours of the New Extractivism in Latin America, 
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environmental impacts, the dispossession of rural people, and structural im-
balances in the legal frameworks that underpin resource extraction.49 
These processes have been associated with hotly contested debates about 
desirable development pathways; with complex local-to-global political econ-
omies that tend to place the apparatus of the state at the service of extractiv-
ism; and with diverse strategies of co-option, co-operation or resistance on the 
part of indigenous peoples affected by commercial operations.50 
In the context of often tense socio-political confrontations, resistance strat-
egies mobilizing international human rights law have driven the emergence of 
new jurisprudential dimensions of the right to property: in a string of cases 
before regional human rights institutions in Africa and the Americas, indige-
nous peoples have invoked this right in order to resist natural resource extrac-
tion on their ancestral lands, and to advance a relation between humans and 
 
45 LATIN AM. PERSP. 4, 4–17 (2018); Lorenzo Pellegrini, Imagineries of Development 
Through Extraction: The ‘History of Bolivian Petroleum’ and the Present Value of the 
Future, GEOFORUM 130, 130–41 (2018); Maristella Svampa, Commodities Consensus: Ne-
oextractivism and Enclosure of the Commons in Latin America, 114 S. ATLANTIC Q. 65, 
65–82 (2015). 
 49 For a more detailed review, see LORENZO COTULA, ‘Land Grabbing’ and Interna-
tional Investment Law: Toward a Global Reconfiguration of Property?, in YEARBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2014–2015 177 (Andrea K. Bjorklund ed., 
2015). See generally Saturnino M. Borras Jr. & Jennifer Franco, From Threat to Oppor-
tunity? Problems with the Idea of a “Code of Conduct” for Land-Grabbing, 13 YALE HUM. 
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 507 (2010); KAITLIN Y. CORDES, LISE JOHNSON & SAM SZOKE-BURLE, 
LAND DEAL DILEMMAS: GRIEVANCES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INVESTOR PROTECTIONS 
(2016), https://doi.org/10.7916/D8513ZFG; LORENZO COTULA, HUMAN RIGHTS, NATURAL 
RESOURCE AND INVESTMENT LAW IN A GLOBALISED WORLD: SHADES OF GREY IN THE 
SHADOW OF THE LAW (2012); DARIA DAVITTI, INVESTMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMED 
CONFLICT: CHARTING AN ELUSIVE INTERSECTION (2019); NATURAL RESOURCES GRABBING: 
AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE (Francesca Romanin Jacur, Angelica Bonfanti, & 
Francesco Seatzu eds., 2015); Cotula, supra note 8; Ӧzsu, supra note 46; Surabhi Ranga-
nathan, Ocean Floor Grab: International Law and the Making of an Extractive Imaginary, 
30 EUR. J. INT’L L. 573 (2019); Philip Seufert, The FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Re-
sponsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests, 10 GLOBALIZATIONS 181 
(2013); Nina Tzouvala, A False Promise? Regulating Land-Grabbing and the Post-Colo-
nial State, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 235 (2019). For a more general reflection, see also Julia 
Dehm, Review Essay, 19 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 763 (2019) (reviewing THE MISERY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONFRONTATION WITH INJUSTICE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (John 
Linarelli, Margot Salomon & Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah eds., 2018). 
 50 Penelope Anthias, Indigenous Peoples and the New Extraction: From Territorial 
Rights to Hydrocarbon Citizenship in the Bolivian Chaco, 45 LATIN AM. PERSP. 136, 143 
(2018) (noting the options the Guaraní people faced when confronted with encroaching 
hydrocarbon claims); Ruth Hall, Marc Edelman, Saturnino M. Borras, Ian Scoones, Ben 
White & Wendy Wolford, Resistance, Acquiescence or Incorporation? An Introduction to 
Land Grabbing and Political Reactions ‘From Below’, 42 J. PEASANT STUD. 467, 483 
(2015) (observing “a spectrum of reactions to land deals which extend far beyond re-
sistance per se”). 
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their surrounding environment that is founded on the collective and socio-
cultural dimensions of lands and resources.51 
These developments raise intriguing questions as to whether and how a 
right that is arguably so closely associated with the “status quo” can be fruit-
fully appropriated and reconfigured in social justice claims. In fact, the appar-
ent gap between the logic of emancipatory struggles and the mainstream fram-
ing of the right to property makes judicial recourse to this right an 
instrumentalist, reactive strategy par excellence, and a useful testing ground 
for critically interrogating the place of these strategies in social justice strug-
gles. 
 
B. Mapping the Terrain 
 
Use of human rights discourses in land struggles is a socially diffuse phe-
nomenon the bounds of which are difficult to delineate with precision. On the 
other hand, indigenous peoples’ reliance on the right to property in interna-
tional human rights proceedings aimed at challenging extractivist develop-
ment models has primarily developed in some fifteen cases taken to the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court),52 and to a lesser 
extent to Africa’s continental human rights institutions, namely the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission)53 and the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court).54 
 
 51 See cases cited infra note 52. 
 52 Kaliña v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 309, ¶ 61 (Nov. 25, 2015); Garífuna Triunfo de la Cruz Cmty. v. Honduras, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 305, ¶ 204 (Oct. 
8, 2015); Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandí v. Panama, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 284 (Oct. 14, 2014); Operation Genesis 
v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
270 (Nov. 20, 2013); Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits, Repara-
tions, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245 (June 27, 2012); Saramaka 
People v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 172 (Nov. 28, 2007); Sawhoyamaxa Indiegenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Repara-
tions, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146 (Mar. 29, 2006); Yakye 
Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparation, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125 (June 17, 2005); Moiwana Cmty. v. Suriname, Merits, Repara-
tions, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124 (June 15, 2005); Mayagna 
(Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
 53 Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Kenya, No. 006/2012, Decision, Afr. 
Ct. H.P.R. (May 26, 2017). 
 54 Cent. for Minority Rights Dev. ex rel. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, No. 
276/2003, Decision, Afr. Comm’n on Hum. and Peoples’ Rts. [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.] (Nov. 
2009); see also Giovanna Gismondi, Denial of Justice: The Latest Indigenous Land Dis-
putes Before the European Court of Human Rights and the Need for an Expansive 
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The cases present extremely diverse factual fabrics and legal arguments, 
and advocacy objectives also differed considerably. Further, the place of the 
right to property varied in the different cases, reflecting diversity in the un-
derlying human rights treaties and the legal strategies pursued, with several 
cases also relying on other human rights. In the lead Inter-American Court 
case Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, an indigenous 
community claimed that, by granting logging concessions in its ancestral 
lands, the government of Nicaragua violated their right to an effective remedy, 
their right to property and several other human rights recognized by the Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights.55 
The Inter-American Court found that, while Nicaragua’s domestic law for-
mally recognized indigenous land rights, it did not provide effective means 
for identifying and protecting indigenous lands in practice. The Court ulti-
mately ordered the government to conduct the demarcation and collective reg-
istration of the community’s ancestral lands before proceeding with any fur-
ther resource allocations that could impinge on those lands.56 
A few other Inter-American Court cases also stemmed from indigenous 
and tribal peoples’ resistance to large-scale petroleum, mining, forestry, or 
infrastructure projects, but the emphasis was on consultation processes more 
than land titling. In Saramaka People v. Suriname—a case concerning the al-
location of logging and mining concessions in a tribal people’s territory—the 
Court devoted considerable attention to issues of consultation and free, prior 
and informed consent (FPIC).57 In finding in favor of the Saramakas, the Inter-
American Court required the government of Suriname to demarcate and title 
the community’s land, but it also called for a wider range of measures to en-
sure consultation and FPIC, independent impact assessments, and effective 
redress, among other things.58 The Inter-American Court further elaborated 
on consultation requirements in the later Kichwa Indigenous People of 
Sarayaku v. Ecuador, a case concerning the allocation of petroleum conces-
sions in the Amazon.59 
Yet other cases concern indigenous claims for the restitution of long-dis-
possessed ancestral lands now occupied by commercial ranching operations. 
This includes several Inter-American Court cases—Yakye Axa Indigenous 
 
Interpretation of Protocol 1, 18 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2016) (discussing relevant 
jurisprudence in Europe). 
 55 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
 56 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 173 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
 57 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 125–37 (Nov. 28, 2007). 
 58 Id. at 214. 
 59 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶¶ 124–232 (June 27, 2012). 
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Community v. Paraguay, Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 
and Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay—initiated by indige-
nous peoples in the Paraguayan Chaco, who were dispossessed of their ances-
tral lands from the late 19th century. These judgments place greater emphasis 
on investigating the continuing relationship between the indigenous peoples 
and their lands, and the relevance of the right to collective property as a nor-
mative foundation for land restitution.60 
Some of the right-to-property cases argued before the African Commission 
and the African Court also concern situations of historical or ongoing evic-
tions and land dispossessions, though in these cases recourse to the right to 
property tends to feature within a much wider range of rights recognized by 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, including non-discrimi-
nation, the right to life, the right to freedom of conscience, the right to educa-
tion and cultural life, peoples’ right to freely dispose of their natural resources 
and the right to development.61 Conservationist arguments were also a feature 
of some of the African Commission and African Court cases, with govern-
ments claiming that the eviction of indigenous peoples from their ancestral 
lands was necessary to preserve fragile ecosystems.62 
Beyond the important differences in the factual circumstances and the le-
gal arguments that characterised each dispute, as a broad generalisation the 
cases’ social justice claims variously combined elements of distribution (in-
sofar as they concerned ownership or control of land and natural resources), 
recognition (because in seeking respect for cultural difference, the legal 
claims often challenged cultural domination and assimilationist logics), and 
representation (seeking to transform patterns of voice in decision making).63 
While litigation was typically confined to demands concerning a specific 
people or territory, these social justice claims often sought to challenge the 
legal arrangements associated with the prevailing extractivist model, and ul-
timately the political economy of vested interests and socio-political relations 
that underpins that model. This was the case whether the claims sought to 
reconfigure control of natural resources in the face of the expanding petroleum 
or mining frontier, or claim restitution of lands now used to sustain a major 
pillar of the national economy. For these reasons, several legal cases were 
 
 60 See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶¶ 126–41 (Mar. 29, 2006). 
 61 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights arts. 2, 4, 8, 14, 17, 21, 22, June 27, 
1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217; see also Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. 
Kenya, No. 006/2012, Decision, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., ¶ 130 (May 26, 2017). 
 62 Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Kenya, No. 006/2012, Decision, Afr. 
Ct. H.P.R., ¶ 130 (May 26, 2017). 
 63 FRASER & HONNETH, supra note 11, at 380. 
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embedded in highly politicized disputes, and litigation often formed part of 
wider strategies of socio-political mobilization.64 
The central role of indigenous and tribal peoples in advancing the claims 
requires further elaboration. In the Americas, that role correlates with a sig-
nificant number of ratifications of the International Labour Organization’s 
(ILO) Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in In-
dependent Countries;65 with broad-based formal support for the United Na-
tions Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP);66 and, in 
some jurisdictions, with the existence of national legislation that establishes 
tailored safeguards for indigenous peoples.67 
In contrast with these formal commitments to indigenous peoples’ rights, 
and sometimes with a political rhetoric that emphasises ethnic diversity and 
respect for minorities, the region has also experienced recurring conflicts be-
tween indigenous movements on the one hand and extractivist interests that 
link the state apparatus to domestic and international businesses on the other, 
within an overarching political economy that tends to hollow out applicable 
legal safeguards from within and to favor the expansion of natural resource 
extraction.68 
In these contexts, resource conflicts are relatively frequent, including vio-
lent conflicts with tragic outcomes, and the adoption of “progressive” legal 
texts has at times been a way for authorities to (be seen to) address the political 
imperative to respond to the tensions, without however fundamentally 
 
 64 For an example concerning the Inter-American Court Sawhoyamaxa case, see Julia 
Cabello Alonso, Sawhoyamaxa and the Path Towards Dignity, 9 RIGHT TO FOOD J. 13 
(2014), https://www.fian.org/fileadmin/media/publications_2015/Right_to_Food_Journal 
_021214.pdf (writing about land occupation following delays in the implementation of the 
Inter-American Court judgment). 
 65 Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991). Fifteen of 
the twenty-two states that have ratified the convention are from Latin America. 
 66 G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP]; see also JESSE HOHMANN & MARC WELLER, THE 
U.N. DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A COMMENTARY (2018); 
Jérémie Gilbert & Corinne Lennox, Towards New Development Paradigms: The United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a Tool to Support Self-Deter-
mined Development, 23 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 104 (2019). 
 67 See, e.g., Law Decree No. 29785 [Ley del derecho a consulta previa a los pueblos 
indígenas u originários, reconocido en el convenio 169 de la organización internacional del 
trabajo (OIT)] Sept. 7, 2011 (Peru). For a critique, see Roger Merino Acuña, Coloniality 
and Indigenous Territorial Rights in the Peruvian Amazon: A Critique of the Prior Con-
sultation, CTR. FOR DEV. STUDIES, UNIV. OF BATH (2015), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstrea 
m/10419/128133/1/bpd38.pdf. 
 68 Armando Guevara Gil & Carla Cabanillas Linares, Mineralizing the Right to Prior 
Consultation: From Recognition to Disregard of Indigenous and Peasant Rights in Peru, 
GLOB. JURIST 1 (2019). 
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changing the development model that created those tensions in the first 
place.69 More generally, formal commitments to the international instruments 
that protect indigenous peoples’ rights coexist with widespread lack of aware-
ness about legal texts and rights, including among government officials, re-
sulting in highly uneven patterns of penetration of international instruments 
into national and subnational administrative practices.70 
In Africa, questions of indigeneity have often involved gaps between an-
thropological conceptions, political positions and international norms. Be-
cause most of the population is of African descent, several governments have 
questioned the relevance of notions of indigeneity, thereby rejecting the very 
premises on which the international protection of indigenous peoples’ rights 
is founded.71 However, recent years have witnessed growing appropriation of 
indigenous peoples language by marginalized groups such as forest dwellers 
and pastoralists, including via litigation before national courts.72 
The African Commission and the African Court have applied the concept 
of indigenous peoples to marginalized minority groups having a strong cul-
tural relationship with land and resources.73 In a case concerning the Ogiek of 
Kenya, for example, the African Court noted the deep relationship that the 
Ogiek had with their traditional land and resources, the Ogiek’s cultural dis-
tinctiveness, and their continued marginalization. It concluded that the Ogiek 
are “an indigenous population . . . having a particular status and deserving 
special protection.”74 This jurisprudential orientation follows the approach de-
veloped over the years by the African Commission’s Working Group on In-
digenous Populations/Communities.75 
 
 69 Id. 
 70 Benedict Kingsbury, Indigenous Peoples, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012). 
 71 AFR. COMM’N ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS & INT’L WORKING GRP. FOR 
INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES, LAND RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS 
POPULATIONS’/COMMUNITIES’ RIGHTS 24 (2017). See Jérémie Gilbert, Litigating Indige-
nous Peoples’ Rights in Africa: Potential, Challenges and Limitations, 66 INT’L & COMP. 
L. Q. 657, 658 (showing that the Central African Republic is the only African state to have 
ratified ILO Convention No. 169. African states have also been reluctant to adopt consti-
tutional or legislative provisions on indigenous peoples, but some have recently done so). 
 72 Gilbert, supra note 71. For an anthropological perspective, see Micaela Pelican & 
Junko Maruyama, The Indigenous Rights Movement in Africa: Perspectives from Bot-
swana and Cameroon, 36(1) AFR. STUDY MONOGRAPHS 49 (2015) (showing an anthropo-
logical perspective). 
 73 Gilbert, supra note 71, at 658–59. 
 74 Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Kenya, No. 006/2012, Decision, Afr. 
Ct. H.P.R., ¶¶ 105–112 (May 26, 2017). 
 75 Afr. Comm’n on Human and People’s Rights, Rep. of the Afr. Comm’n’s Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations/Cmtys., OC/OS(XXXIV)/345 (May 14, 2003), avaial-
able at https://www.achpr.org/public/Document/file/Any/expert_report_on_indigenous_c 
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Further complexities must be acknowledged in discussing actors and is-
sues of agency, not least because social realities do not always neatly fit legal 
categories: social identities may present fluid boundaries and evolve over 
time; indigeneity may only be one register among several that a group may 
use in advocacy strategies; and “communities” may present significant social 
differentiation and divided opinion. The relationship between indigenous peo-
ples and their legal advisors would also deserve closer exploration: public in-
terest lawyers may advance their own strategies,76 and practitioners recognize 
that deliberate arrangements are needed to ensure that those whose rights are 
at stake are in the driving seat—from framing public campaigns to conducting 
human rights litigation.77 
 
C. Normative (Re)configurations 
 
In a sense, indigenous peoples’ recourse to the internationally recognized 
human right to property is remarkable given the ways in which international 
law concepts were historically deployed to marginalize indigenous peoples;78 
how colonial powers deployed Lockean notions of property to legitimize their 
appropriation of indigenous lands;79 and the gulf between property concepts 
and indigenous ideas.80 While property presupposes a clear “separation be-
tween the owner and the owned,” and a commodity (a “thing”) that forms the 
object of the property relations, many indigenous systems emphasise the all-
encompassing inter-penetration between people and the environment 
 
ommunities.pdf; see also Paul Tamuno, New Human Rights Concept for Old African Prob-
lems: An Analysis of the Challenges of Introducing and Implementing Indigenous Rights 
in Africa, 61 J. AFR. L. 305 (2017). 
 76 See, e.g., Peter Brett, Cause Lawyers sans Frontières: Juristes Sud-Africains et Judi-
ciarisation du Politique en Afrique Australe [Cause Lawyers Beyond Borders: The South 
African Legal Profession and Regional Judicialization], 138 POLITIQUE AFRICAINE [AFR. 
POL.] 93 (Raphaël Botiveau trans., 2015) (discussing the spread of public litigation ap-
proaches, including indigenous peoples’ claims, from the United States to South Africa 
and its neighboring countries, as well as the political processes influencing South African 
lawyers’ involvement with national, regional, and transnational litigation). 
 77 See, e.g., MAXIMILIANO MENDIETA MIRANDA & JULIA CABELLO ALONSO, ADVANCING 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS THROUGH REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF 
PARAGUAY (2017), https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17602IIED.pdf (discussing the authors’ role 
in supporting five indigenous rights cases at the Inter-American human rights system); see 
also TOM LOMAX, ASSERTING COMMUNITY LAND RIGHTS USING RSPO COMPLAINT 
PROCEDURES IN INDONESIA AND LIBERIA (2015), https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/12584IIED.pdf. 
 78 See generally ANTHONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004). 
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surrounding them, reflected in the intimate connection between land, tradi-
tional ways of life and systems of belief.81 And while Western conceptions of 
property have often identified in the right to sell a key attribute of property, 
many indigenous systems frame land as inalienable collective heritage. 
It was the explicit affirmation of the right to property in regional human 
rights treaties that, from a pragmatic viewpoint, made this right a relevant nor-
mative reference for indigenous peoples’ strategies to protect their claims to 
land and resources.82 Recourse to international law partly responded to per-
ceived shortcomings of arrangements for contesting decision making in na-
tional legal and political arenas: legal activists have talked of the “structural 
discrimination” that indigenous peoples experience in some national legal sys-
tems—owing to legal categories that are not aligned with indigenous peoples’ 
conceptions, to the non-recognition of indigenous peoples’ claims, and/or to 
a general policy thrust that favors commercial interests.83 The exhaustion of 
domestic remedies requirements commonly included in human rights treaties 
inherently frame recourse to international redress as a last resort.84 
In mobilizing the internationally recognized human right to property, in-
digenous peoples translated indigenous concepts into property terms. But they 
also sought to reconfigure the right to property as a vehicle for reclaiming 
control of strategic resources and articulating a more complex relation be-
tween people and territory, whereby land and resources are interrelated with 
history, culture, way of life and sense of belonging, and with political and 
economic agency via free, prior and informed consent.85 In addressing these 
claims, regional human rights institutions have drawn extensively on interna-
tional instruments concerning indigenous peoples’ rights, particularly ILO 
Convention No. 169 and the UNDRIP.86 This has promoted cross-fertilisation 
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between generally applicable human rights concepts and international norms 
tailored to the specific circumstances of indigenous peoples. 
The fragmentation of the international human rights regime, including ge-
ographically into different regional systems, makes it impossible to draw gen-
eral conclusions about the contours of the right to property that are not con-
tingent on relevant contextual and normative parameters.87 However, the 
resulting jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court, and to some extent of its 
African counterparts, does provide pointers for understanding the legal con-
figuration of the right to property in relation to indigenous land claims. Two 
points deserve particular attention: one concerning the scope of the right to 
property, the other the arrangements for its protection under international law. 
First, international human rights jurisprudence has broadened the rele-
vance of the right to property to a wide range of tenure configurations. While 
the liberal tradition tended to anchor the right to property to protecting indi-
vidual ownership over assets often conceived of in monetary terms, it is now 
clear that regional human rights instruments protect diverse sets of rights, in-
cluding collective rights founded on indigenous tenure systems and not for-
mally recognized as ownership under domestic law, and that they recognize 
the social, cultural and spiritual dimensions of land and natural resources. 
This orientation was already apparent in the early Mayagna (Sumo) Awas 
Tingni Community v. Nicaragua judgment, in which the Inter-American Court 
held that the right to property has an “autonomous meaning” under interna-
tional law, which “cannot be made equivalent to the meaning given to them 
in domestic law”; that this right protects collective rights held under custom-
ary law, even in the absence of officially recognized title deeds; and that “the 
close ties of indigenous people with the land must be recognized and under-
stood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integ-
rity, and their economic survival.”88 
Subsequent jurisprudence has further elaborated on these notions, for ex-
ample extending protection to the collective claims of tribal peoples based on 
“their longstanding use and occupation of the land and resources necessary 
for their physical and cultural survival,” irrespective of clearly established 
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customary law claims;89 and even to situations where an indigenous people 
has unwillingly long been deprived of the physical possession of the land but 
has maintained strong cultural and spiritual ties to it, in which case the right 
to collective property may provide the basis for land restitution claims.90 
Second, regional human rights jurisprudence has reconfigured the mecha-
nisms for the legal protection of the right to property. In the liberal tradition, 
these are usually centered on legal safeguards against expropriation, and pos-
sibly regulatory interferences, including compensation, non-discrimination, 
public purpose and/or due process. These conceptions are broadly reflected in 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which has high-
lighted the need for authorities to strike a fair balance between public and 
private interests including through appropriate procedural and compensatory 
safeguards.91 
On the other hand, in cases concerning commercial or development pro-
jects in ancestral territories, regional human rights institutions have placed 
considerable emphasis on connecting the right to collective property to con-
sultation and consent processes. In Saramaka People v. Suriname, the Inter-
American Court noted that, while states can ultimately compress tribal peo-
ples’ right to collective property, they can only do so if certain conditions are 
met. These conditions were held to include the “effective participation” of the 
tribal people in decisions concerning developments on their lands; a “reason-
able benefit” for the tribal people from any such developments; and a prior 
and independent environmental and social impact assessment.92 The Court 
further clarified that, in the case of large-scale projects having major impacts, 
“effective participation” requires the state “not only to consult with the Sara-
makas, but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent, according to 
their customs and traditions.”93 
The more recent Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador judg-
ment referred in more general terms to a “right to consultation,” rather than 
specifically to free, prior and informed consent, though it also clarified that 
the consultation must be in good faith and “with the aim of reaching an agree-
ment or obtaining consent.”94 African human rights institutions have 
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developed broadly comparable approaches to configuring the protection of the 
right to property in relation to indigenous peoples, including by explicitly 
cross-referencing the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court.95 
While this jurisprudence leaves the boundaries of consultation and consent 
indeterminate, the approach goes beyond the traditional liberal framing of the 
right to property, moving away from primarily negative safeguards aimed at 
protecting rights holders against arbitrary or discriminatory conduct, toward a 
greater emphasis on voice in decision making and control over processes of 
change. This orientation resonates with some of the ways indigenous peoples 
themselves have framed their claims to land and resources, particularly the 
importance they have traditionally attached—in both legal and discursive 
practices—to prior consultation and consent as vehicles for exercising their 
right to self-determination.96 
 
D. Preliminary Appraisal 
 
The international jurisprudence on the right to collective property situates 
human rights as a contested space, casting the normative content as the prod-
uct of contestation between different interpretations of human rights norms, 
and—at a deeper level—between different conceptions of property and ulti-
mately different visions of society. The activation of the right to property in 
emancipatory struggles also raises some difficult questions about the interface 
between human rights and social justice. 
A first set of questions exposes the conceptual and concrete limitations of 
the approach, in both jurisprudential and practical terms. Arguably, even a 
reconfigured right to collective property can translate into outcomes that are 
coextensive with resource extraction and commodification. Regional human 
rights institutions have recognized that the protection of “the right to property 
. . . is not absolute,” and that under certain circumstances the state can law-
fully restrict that right.97 Commercial projects that undermine indigenous live-
lihoods and ways of life could still go ahead if certain conditions are complied 
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with, within a state-centric system that grants governments latitude in over-
riding traditional claims.98 
In this context, FPIC is itself a hotly contested concept, with different ac-
tors (governments, businesses, indigenous movements) putting forward dif-
ferent interpretations that range from transformative to box-ticking;99 private 
sector-driven “thin” notions of consent acquiring growing traction; and sub-
stantial power imbalances often leading to ineffectual processes that reform, 
and as such legitimize, but do not fundamentally challenge, extractivism.100 
Further, critical scholars have pointed to the “problematic heritage” of con-
cepts such as consultation and consent, the ideational roots of which were 
found to go back to the colonial enterprise, with enduring consequences for 
the ability of those notions to underpin truly transformational agendas.101 
In addition, a focus on consultation in externally driven development mod-
els could obscure more foundational rights necessary to advance a proactive 
indigenous agenda.102 And while reframing indigenous claims in right to prop-
erty terms can provide indigenous peoples with well-established international 
protection in the face of powerful commercial interests, it can also undermine 
some of the fundamental parameters of indigenous peoples’ relationship with 
their surrounding environment. Indigenous tenure concepts do not necessarily 
translate well into property terms, even if these terms are substantially recon-
figured. 
Indeed, the private law notion of property seems ill-suited as a vehicle for 
territorial claims that are closely associated with collective identity, traditional 
ways of life, and the exercise of the right to self-determination. At root, those 
claims pertain to the realm of the political: they embody an attempt to reimag-
ine the national social contract, and the structures of sovereignty and public 
governance. Conceptual misalignments between the notions of property and 
territory can have practical implications, for example in legal regimes where 
the titling of property requires evidence of productive land use. This results in 
legal title protections for relatively small portions of territory to the exclusion 
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of traditional hunting, gathering or fishing grounds, of sacred sites, and of land 
reserves set aside for future generations.103 
Further, the emphasis regional human rights institutions have placed on 
the demarcation and titling of indigenous peoples’ lands, including as a form 
of reparation in the face of commercial encroachments, could be at odds with 
traditional systems that often envisage inherently more fluid conceptions of 
space and territory, and even of communities themselves. Some passages cited 
in the international jurisprudence resonate with common topoi of the literature 
that, often starting from liberal premises, makes the economic case for land 
titling as a pathway to tenure security conceived of in eminently Western 
terms.104 
To be sure, there are diverse approaches to land demarcation and registra-
tion. While some reflect productivist concerns about individual ownership, 
incentives to invest, access to credit, and ultimately increased production,105 
others are primarily framed in collective terms, and motivated by concerns 
about promoting endogenous development strategies and protecting collective 
lands from dispossession by powerful political and economic actors.106 
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Depending on the situation, however, border lines may be fluid, for example 
where multiple objectives coexist in the same public intervention, where am-
biguities affect the framing or prioritization of those objectives, or where 
changes in emphasis occur over time. 
The tensions inherent in the property framing may themselves create space 
for these ambiguities and transitions. In their concrete historical manifesta-
tions, land demarcation and registration programs—particularly those in-
spired by a productivist logic—have been shown to result in complex long-
term socio-economic outcomes. These often involve processes of land com-
modification and indirect dispossession, including through transactions under 
varying economic and political pressures after the issuance of titles.107 These 
circumstances call for empirical research to more rigorously assess the long-
term outcomes of international human rights litigation.108 
In more immediate concrete terms, there have been significant delays in 
the implementation of several international rulings, and some judgments are 
yet to be complied with, in full or in part.109 This mixed record of compliance 
begs questions about the effectiveness of human rights strategies. A particu-
larly fine-grained empirical picture of the politics of implementation is emerg-
ing in relation to regional human rights litigation initiated by indigenous peo-
ples in the Paraguayan Chaco.110 
As discussed, indigenous peoples in the Chaco were dispossessed of their 
traditional territories from the late 19th century and were eventually employed 
as laborers on cattle ranches.111 Over time, the area came to host commercial 
ranching activities on a substantial scale.112 Law reforms and legal support 
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from the 1980s led the indigenous communities to initiate land restitution 
claims.113 Parallel or subsequent developments saw many community mem-
bers leaving the ranches and relocating to precarious settlements at the margin 
of the local highway, in extremely challenging living conditions.114 
After protracted and ultimately unsuccessful domestic litigation, several 
communities initiated human rights proceedings at the Inter-American human 
rights system.115 The proceedings resulted in favorable Inter-American Court 
judgments, including land restitution orders, based on the Inter-American 
Court’s finding that the petitioners had maintained a strong socio-cultural re-
lationship with their ancestral lands, and the Court’s framing of the right to 
property as protecting collective land claims considered in their socio-cultural 
dimensions.116 
However, these “wins” were followed by long implementation delays. Ul-
timately, social mobilization led to some advances in implementation, includ-
ing the return of some 7,700 hectares of land to an indigenous community (out 
of a total 10,700 concerned by the court case) with regards to Xákmok Kásek 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, and the allocation of alternative land in 
lieu of restitution to another community, in relation to Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay.117 
In Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, the community 
sought to break the impasse in the implementation of a land restitution judg-
ment by (re)occupying the land.118 Mobilization led to Parliament passing leg-
islation providing for the expropriation of the land and for its formal restitu-
tion to the community.119 However, even these successes were partial and 
contingent: field-based research found the alternative land allocated to the 
Yakye Axa indigenous community to be inaccessible, and the expropriation 
law adopted in the Sawhoyamaxa case was not yet implemented.120 This 
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situation reportedly led to the creation of inherently unstable “liminal spaces” 
where de jure and de facto land control were fundamentally misaligned.121   
Overall, these conceptual and practical considerations provide a caution-
ary tale about the effectiveness of reactive human rights strategies in sustain-
ing social justice struggles. At the same time, nearly twenty years since the 
Inter-American Court Mayagna case that first pioneered use of the right to 
property to protect indigenous peoples’ lands, it is easy to take for granted the 
significance of these jurisprudential developments. In having recourse to re-
gional human rights institutions, social actors have, in effect, sought to rene-
gotiate politically sensitive national and subnational governance spaces asso-
ciated with natural resource extraction. In so doing, and despite the inherent 
limitations of the property framing, and those flowing from the politics of im-
plementation, human rights advocates have confronted difficult social justice 
issues at the foundations of prevailing economic models, with the reconfig-
ured right to collective property tending to shift control over land and territo-
ries to groups that manage resources according to systems that are not coher-
ent with neoliberal or extractivist ordering. 
The political backlashes the legal cases unleashed in several countries, par-
ticularly in Latin America, including fundamental threats to the system thinly 
veiled as proposals for “reform,”122 suggest that, for all its limitations, mobi-
lizing human rights can touch a politically sensitive nerve capable of upsetting 
political and economic interests. These interests include those of the commer-
cial actors most directly affected and their political allies, but they also relate, 
in more general terms, to the ability of the state to advance a vision of devel-
opment premised on the exploitation of natural resources as a mode for inte-
grating resource-dependent countries into capitalist modes of production. 
Viewed in this light, the mixed record of compliance is not surprising: hu-
man rights strategies ultimately challenge aspects of the prevailing model of 
national development, and the political economy that sustains it. Any eman-
cipatory strategy deployed in these circumstances would arguably be likely to 
meet stiff resistance. And where material outcomes are disappointing, ques-
tions remain as to whether and how rights-claiming can still help move the 
agenda forward in political and discursive terms. Indeed, even unenforced 
judgments can produce consequences, for example if they help cement social 
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identities, catalyze public mobilization, reframe contested issues and ulti-
mately shift public policy.123 
In the Sawhoyamaxa case, for example, wielding the favorable Inter-
American Court judgment was reported to have featured prominently in social 
mobilization, including to legitimize a land occupation that, while illegal un-
der national law, would now be justified by the higher moral authority of in-
ternational law, effectively reframing the issues at stake and “allowing indig-
enous peoples to transform cases of trespassing into land rights claims.”124 
The land occupation in the aftermath of the Sawhoyamaxa judgment also il-
lustrates how appropriating human rights can catalyse public mobilization in 
ways that go significantly beyond the perimeter inscribed by a strict juristic 
interpretation of the legal concepts at play: while juristic notions are neces-
sarily central to the legal case, public mobilization around the litigation can 
involve more far-reaching—and radical—social and discursive practices.125 
In turn, this “reframing effect” of rights-claiming can generate repercus-
sions well beyond the specific resource dispute the relevant case originally 
referred to.126 This is not only because regional human rights institutions have 
cross-referenced their own and each other’s decisions, leading to the progres-
sive development of an authoritative body of international jurisprudence that 
can have a bearing on large numbers of resource disputes.127 Outside of any 
legal proceedings, indigenous peoples from different geographical and socio-
economic contexts have invoked advances in international human rights juris-
prudence as part of their advocacy to persuade government agencies to recog-
nize their natural resource claims.128 
While highlighting both the conceptual and the material limitations of the 
right to collective property, these jurisprudential and discursive developments 
show that human rights have deeply contested meanings. They also show that 
use of human rights in social struggles can push the boundaries of juristic in-
terpretations, and ultimately shift the normative contours of human rights 
themselves. And even a right that is so closely associated with the functioning 
of the capitalist economy has been tactically appropriated and to some extent 
reconfigured to challenge aspects of the natural resource extraction upon 
which that economy rests. 
 
 123 CÉSAR RODRÍGUEZ-GARAVITO, Beyond Enforcement: Assessing and Enhancing Judi-
cial Impact, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JUDGMENTS AND THE POLITICS OF COMPLIANCE 75, 78–79 & 
86–89 (Malcolm Langford, César Rodríguez-Garavito, & Julieta Rossi eds., 2017). 
 124 STRATEGIC LITIGATION IMPACTS, supra note 27, at 74. 
 125 Id. at 21, 36. 
 126 RODRÍGUEZ-GARAVITO, supra note 123, at 93. 
 127 Cent. for Minority Rights Dev. ex rel. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, No. 
276/2003, Decision, Afr. Comm’n on Hum. and Peoples’ Rts. [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶¶ 
159–162, 191 (Nov. 2009). 
 128 See, e.g., NGUIFFO ET AL., supra note 81 (discussing the ACtHPR’s Ogiek judgment 
in the context of policy advocacy by indigenous peoples in Cameroon). 
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IV. “CONSTITUTIVE” HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGIES: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
PEASANTS’ RIGHTS 
A. Introductory Remarks 
 
While reactive strategies mobilize imperfectly aligned human rights in-
struments to respond to a given problem or situation, constitutive strategies—
as conceived of in this study—aim to sustain systemic change at scale and in 
the longer term, through creating new rights or reconfiguring existing ones. 
In practice, border lines are blurred: as discussed, reactive strategies can shift 
the normative content of human rights law, with potential implications beyond 
the situation the action originally responded to. 
Examples of constitutive strategies include the public mobilization that led 
to the development of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples,129 the harnessing of rights by social movements and NGOs 
working to change the international legal and institutional architecture of food 
and agriculture,130 and agrarian movements’ use of rights to articulate their 
struggles over land, seeds and the global food regime.131 The rights-based ad-
vocacy of agrarian movements provides an insightful case study to interrogate 
constitutive modes. The recent culmination of that advocacy in the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in 
Rural Areas makes the case study a particularly timely one.132 
 
B. Mapping the Terrain 
 
In spite of skepticism for rights discourses and legal processes, agrarian 
movements have long mobilized rights not only to challenge the building 
blocks of economic ordering through “reactive” legal action in national and 
 
 129 See generally S.J. Rombouts, The Evolution of Indigenous Peoples’ Consultation 
Rights Under the ILO and U.N. Regimes, 53 STAN. J. INT’L L. 169 (2017). 
 130 See Civil Society and Indigenous Peoples’ Mechanism for Relations with the UN 
Committee on World Food Security, INT’L FOOD SEC. & NUTRITION CIVIL SOC’Y 
MECHANISM, http://www.csm4cfs.org/ (last visited Feb. 29, 2020); see also Oliver De 
Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food),  Final Rep.: The Transformative Po-
tential of the Right to Food, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/57 (Jan. 24, 2014); Michael Fakhri, 
Rethinking the Right to Good (Part Two), LEGAL FORUM (Sept. 10, 2018), https://legalform. 
blog/2018/09/10/rethinking-the-right-to-food-part-two-michael-fakhri/; Tomaso Ferrando 
& Jose Luis Vivero-Pol, Commons and ‘Commoning’: A ‘New’ Old Narrative to Enrich 
the Food Sovereignty and Right to Food Claims, RIGHT TO FOOD & NUTRITION WATCH 
(2017), https://www.righttofoodandnutrition.org/files/02.rtfanw-2017_eng_17_12_article 
-5_web_rz.pdf (providing rights-based perspectives on the global food system). 
 131 See PRISCILLA CLAEYS, LA VIA CAMPESINA, FROM FOOD SOVEREIGNTY TO PEASANTS’ 
RIGHTS: AN OVERVIEW OF VIA CAMPESINA’S STRUGGLE FOR NEW HUMAN RIGHTS (2013), 
https://www.viacampesina.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2013/05/EN-02.pdf. 
 132 G.A. Res. 73/165, supra note 9. 
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international spaces,133 but also to articulate the vision of a locally controlled 
food system that significantly departs from prevailing forms. The interna-
tional agrarian movement La Via Campesina has been at the forefront of these 
efforts, deploying rights language in its own statements and declarations, and 
advocating for a United Nations instrument that would affirm the rights of 
peasants.134 
This human rights advocacy has been inscribed in a wider process of trans-
national political mobilization that gained momentum from the 1990s, as a 
reaction to the pressures that changing policy and market forces placed on 
rural areas in many parts of the global South. Depending on the context, these 
forces included structural adjustment, trade liberalization, the dumping of sub-
sidized farm produce, and growing concentration in agricultural value chains 
both upstream (e.g., seeds, machinery agrochemicals) and downstream (e.g., 
processing, distribution) of farming.135 
In this context, re-appropriating the notion of “peasants” and advocating 
for the international recognition of peasants’ human rights became part of a 
“struggle among models” of agricultural development, and a vehicle to de-
mand normative shifts towards a different economic paradigm.136 Perceived 
gaps in the ability of existing human rights instruments to cater for the needs 
and aspirations of rural people led agrarian movements to prioritize the crea-
tion of new human rights over the mobilization of existing ones, and to seek 
to institutionalise conceptions of human rights that would depart from the lib-
eral political tradition.137 
A milestone in this process was the adoption, by La Via Campesina’s in-
ternational conference in Maputo, 2008, of the “Declaration of Rights of Peas-
ants – Women and Men.”138 This document represented the culmination of a 
long-term process originating in village-level deliberations that took place in 
Indonesia from the late 1990s.139 Under the leadership of national peasant 
 
 133 See, e.g., YUDHA FATHONI, INT’L INST. ENV’R & DEV., CHALLENGING THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INDONESIA’S INVESTMENT LAW (2014), http://pubs.iied.org/G0372 
1/. 
 134 Marc Edelman & Carwil James, “Peasants’ Rights and the UN System: Quixotic 
Struggle? Or Emancipatory Idea Whose Time Has Come? 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 1, 81 
(2011); see also Priscilla Claeys, Food Sovereignty and the Recognition of New Rights for 
Peasants at the UN: A Critical Overview of La Via Campesina’s Rights Claims over the 
Last 20 Years, 12 GLOBALIZATIONS 4 (2014). 
 135 See Saturnino M. Borras Jr., The Politics of Transnational Agrarian Movements, 41 
DEV. & CHANGE 5; see also Edelman & James, supra note 134, at 88–89. 
 136 Edelman & James, supra note 134, at 83, 92. 
 137 Id.; Claeys, supra note 134, at 2. 
 138 LA VIA CAMPESINA, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF PEASANTS – WOMEN AND MEN 
(2009), https://viacampesina.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2011/03/Declaration-of-ri 
ghts-of-peasants-2009.pdf. 
 139 See MANSOUR FAKIH ET. AL, INT’L INST. ENV’T & DEV., COMMUNITY INTEGRATED 
PEST MANAGEMENT. IN INDONESIA: INSTITUTIONALIZING PARTICIPATION AND PEOPLE 
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organization, and La Via Campesina member, Serikat Petani Indonesia, the 
action was taken to the regional and then global level.140 This process of in-
ternationalization was not without challenges, due to the somewhat different 
emphases and priorities in the advocacy led by La Via Campesina members 
from different regions,141 but it ultimately federated the movement around a 
clear set of demands. The Via Campesina Declaration provided a springboard 
to advance, at the United Nations, a tailored human rights instrument that 
would more fully align the international human rights system to the life expe-
riences of rural people and small-scale rural producers. 
Through alliances with supportive states, United Nations human rights 
mandate holders, and human rights NGOs such as FIAN International and 
CETIM, La Via Campesina worked to inscribe the issue on the agenda of the 
United Nations Human Rights Council.142 In 2012, the Human Rights Council 
established a working group to develop an international soft-law instrument 
on the rights of peasants—the Open-Ended Inter-Governmental Working 
Group on a United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other 
People Working in Rural Areas.143 Over the years, the Working Group re-
ceived extensive inputs from La Via Campesina and other international fed-
erations representing rural constituencies (pastoralists, indigenous peoples, 
fishers, agricultural workers), supported by FIAN International and CETIM, 
and by engaged academics.144 In September 2018, the Human Rights Council 
adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other 
People Working in Rural Areas,145 and the United Nations General Assembly 
followed suit in December 2018.146 
While many high-income countries abstained or voted against the resolu-
tion both at the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly,147 this 
 
CENTERED APPROACHES (2003), https://pubs.iied.org/9293IIED/?s=IP (particularly Annex 
5 containing a draft of The Peasant’s Rights Charter). 
 140 Claeys, supra 134, at 5–6. 
 141 Id. at 458–459. 
 142 Priscilla Claeys, The Rise of New Rights for Peasants: From Reliance to NGO Inter-
mediaries to Direct Representation, 9 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 386, 391–392 (2018). 
 143 Human Rights Council Res. 21/19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/21/19, at 2 (Oct. 11, 
2012). The resolution was adopted with the votes of developing and transition economies 
(23), while most European and North American states voted against (9), and fifteen states 
abstained. Id. 
 144 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHE GOLAY, GENEVA ACAD. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN LAW AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGAL REFLECTIONS ON THE RIGHTS OF PEASANTS AND OTHER PEOPLE 
WORKING IN RURAL AREAS  (2013), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCou 
ncil/WGPleasants/Golay.pdf. 
 145 Human Rights Council Res. 39/3, U.N. Doc A/HRC/39/L.16 (Sept. 26, 2018). 
 146 G.A. Res. 73/74(b) (Dec. 17, 2018). 
 147 At the Human Rights Council, Australia, Hungary and the United Kingdom voted 
against, while Belgium, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Spain were among the 
eleven states that abstained. See Human Rights Council Adopts Five Resolutions, Including 
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outcome represents a remarkable success for an advocacy campaign that many 
saw as facing an uphill struggle. The very recent adoption of the U.N. Decla-
ration makes it impossible to draw conclusions on its effectiveness in catalys-
ing the change agrarian movements sought. However, some initial reflections 
on the text of the Declaration and the process that led to its adoption can shed 
some light on the place of human rights in social justice advocacy. 
 
C. Normative (Re)configurations 
 
The United Nations Declaration is framed as a comprehensive document 
that engages, through a human rights lens, the diverse arenas in which peas-
ants and other people working in rural areas encounter the public policies and 
business practices that shape the global food system. The Declaration tackles 
“distributive” issues such as control of the means of production, and the pa-
rameters of trading relations, but it also embodies concerns about recognition 
and representation.148 These concerns are partly reflected in the Declaration’s 
re-appropriation of the notion of “peasants,” and its emphasis on the special 
circumstances of peasants and their particularly strong connection to rural 
lands. This is particularly explicit in the Via Campesina Declaration, which 
defines “peasant” as “a man or woman of the land,”149 but it is also present in 
the U.N. Declaration, which refers to peasants’ “special dependency on and 
attachment to the land.”150 
According to the U.N. Declaration, a peasant is 
any person who engages or who seeks to engage alone, or in 
association with others or as a community, in small-scale ag-
ricultural production for subsistence and/or for the market, and 
who relies significantly, though not necessarily exclusively, on 
family or household labour and other non-monetized ways of 
 
on Burundi, Syria, and on the Rights of Peasants, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMM. (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx 
?NewsID=23660&LangID=E. At the General Assembly, Australia, Hungary, Israel, New 
Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States were among the eight states 
that voted against, while Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liech-
tenstein, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Ro-
mania, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain were among the 
fifty-four that abstained. See U.N. GAOR, 73rd Sess., 55th plen. mtg., at 25, U.N. DOC. 
A/73/PV.55 (Dec. 17, 2018). 
 148 See also Claeys, supra 134, at 9. 
 149 LA VIA CAMPESINA, supra note 138, at art. 1, ¶ 1. 
 150 G.A. Res. 73/165, supra note 9, at art. 1, ¶ 1. 
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organizing labour, and who has a special dependency on and 
attachment to the land.151 
This definition covers wide-ranging livelihood strategies spanning the 
spectrum of subsistence to commercial agriculture, with key defining features 
including the small scale of operation, the significant reliance on family or 
otherwise non-monetised labour, and the special relation to the land. 
In line with the constitutive nature of the strategy, the U.N. Declaration 
establishes significant departures from existing human rights forms. Follow-
ing on the strong definitional connection the Declaration draws between peas-
ants and land, the Declaration’s substantive provisions place considerable em-
phasis on the relation between human rights on the one hand, and the land and 
resource rights of peasants and other people working in rural areas on the 
other. While all rights are indivisible and the Declaration explicitly rules out 
hierarchies of rights,152 it nonetheless seems significant that, in the outline of 
the Declaration, the right of peasants and other people working in rural areas 
“to have access to . . . the natural resources . . . that are required to enjoy ade-
quate living conditions”153 precedes the affirmation of other rights such as the 
rights to life, physical and mental integrity, liberty and security of person.154 
In addition, the U.N. Declaration affirms that peasants and other people 
living in rural areas have a right to land, both individually and collectively.155 
This includes the right “to achieve an adequate standard of living, to have a 
place to live in security, peace and dignity and to develop their cultures.”156 
The right to land is subject to limitations that are determined by law, that com-
ply with international human rights obligations, and that are necessary to re-
spect the rights of others or for “meeting the just and most compelling require-
ments of a democratic society.”157 
It should be noted that the close relation between land and human rights 
has long been recognized, including in the international jurisprudence dis-
cussed in Section III. Examples of most obviously relevant human rights in-
clude the rights to property, to housing, to food (where people depend on nat-
ural resources for their food security), to enjoy one’s own culture (where 
traditional cultures are connected to land and resources) and to self-determi-
nation, as well as indigenous peoples’ rights to their ancestral territories, to 
name but a few internationally recognized human rights. That said, all human 
 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at annex, ¶ 5. 
 153 Id. at art. 5. 
 154 Id. at art. 6. 
 155 Id. at art. 17, ¶ 1. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at art. 28, ¶ 2. 
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rights are interdependent and interrelated, so the interface between land rights 
and human rights encompasses all internationally recognized human rights.158 
With a few exceptions,159 however, the relationship between land and hu-
man rights has traditionally been a mediated one, for example by the role land 
plays in enabling human rights holders to enjoy tangible or intangible goods 
such as housing, food, and culture. While the full implications of the U.N. 
Declaration will depend on how it is interpreted and applied, a “right to land” 
establishes a more direct relationship between people and land, reflecting the 
importance of land and natural resources in the lives of peasants and other 
people working in rural areas. 
In fact, while earlier human rights instruments partly frame land issues in 
the context of strategies to implement other more fundamental human rights, 
such as the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to be free from 
hunger,160 the U.N. Declaration inverts that relationship by inscribing the at-
tainment of an adequate standard of living within the framework of an encom-
passing human right to land—though the Declaration also recognizes a sepa-
rate, free-standing right to an adequate standard of living for peasants and their 
families.161 
Unlike the right to property, which—like the right to land—arguably es-
tablishes a more immediate connection between land and human rights, the 
right to land provides more explicit normative foundations for redistributive 
agrarian reform, provided the reform complies with the significant qualifica-
tions established in the U.N. Declaration itself, such as “securing due recog-
nition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others.”162 Indeed, in addition 
to requiring states to recognize the land tenure rights of peasants and people 
working in rural areas, including “customary land tenure rights not currently 
protected by law,” and to protect peasants from arbitrary eviction, the U.N. 
Declaration calls on states, “where appropriate,” to take “appropriate 
 
 158 On the relation between land rights and human rights, see Oliver De Schutter, The 
Emerging Human Right to Land, 12 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 303 (2010); Jeremie Gil-
bert, Land Rights as Human Rights: The Case for a Specific Right to Land, 18 SUR-INT’L 
J. ON HUM. RTS. 113 (2014); Cotula, supra note 8; Kaitlin Cordes, Is There a Human Right 
to Land?, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV. BLOG (Nov. 8, 2017), https://blogs.ei.columb 
ia.edu/2017/11/08/is-owning-land-a-human-right/. 
 159 See, e.g., Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Inde-
pendent Countries, June 27, 1989, arts. 13–19, 1650 U.N.T.S. 384. 
 160 For example, in recognizing the “fundamental right of everyone to be free from hun-
ger,” states are required to take a range of necessary measures, as relevant, including “re-
forming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development of 
natural resources.” International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, art. 11, ¶ 2, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 161 G.A. Res. 73/165, supra note 9, at art. 16. 
 162 Id. at art. 28. 
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measures to carry out agrarian reforms in order to facilitate the broad and eq-
uitable access to land and other natural resources.”163 
The Declaration’s emphasis on peasants’ access to means of production 
such as land and natural resources also emerges in other novel human rights 
configurations. For example, the Declaration affirms peasants’ “right to 
seeds,” which is defined to include protection of traditional knowledge and 
the right to save, use, exchange and sell their farm-saved seeds.164 Even well-
established human rights acquire new productive dimensions when applied to 
the specific circumstances of peasants and other people working in rural areas. 
In reaffirming the right to seek, receive, develop and impart information, for 
example, the Declaration clarifies that this right includes “information about 
factors that may affect the production, processing, marketing and distribution 
of [peasants’] products.”165 
Similarly, the right to adequate standards of living is connected to a right 
“to facilitated access to the means of production necessary to achieve them, 
including production tools, technical assistance, credit, insurance and other 
financial services,” as well as “appropriate measures to favor the access of 
peasants and other people working in rural areas to the means of transportation 
and the processing, drying and storage facilities necessary for selling their 
products on local, national and regional markets at prices that guarantee them 
a decent income and livelihood.”166 
Besides this emphasis on the concrete, productive dimensions of food and 
agriculture and the real-life factors that affect rural livelihoods and the struc-
ture of agricultural value chains, the Declaration also pays significant atten-
tion to the voice of peasants and other working rural people in public decision 
making. For example, through a carefully worded provision that essentially 
calls on states to ensure that peasants and other people working in rural areas 
can have a say in decisions that could affect them,167 and by recognising the 
 
 163 Id. at art. 17, ¶¶ 3, 6. 
 164 Id. at art. 17, 19. The wording of the Declaration echoes the preamble of the Interna-
tional Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, which refers to “the 
rights recognized in this Treaty to save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved seed and other 
propagating material.” Nov. 3, 2001, 2400 U.N.T.S. 303. 
 165 G.A. Res. 73/165, supra note 9, at art. 11, ¶ 1. 
 166 Id. at art. 16, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 167 The provision states: 
Without disregarding specific legislation on indigenous peoples, before 
adopting and implementing legislation and policies, international agree-
ments and other decision-making processes that may affect the rights of 
peasants and other people working in rural areas, States shall consult and 
cooperate in good faith with peasants and other people working in rural 
areas through their own representative institutions, engaging with and 
seeking the support of peasants and other people working in rural areas 
who could be affected by decisions before those decisions are made, and 
responding to their contributions, taking into consideration existing 
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role of “strong and independent” organizations representative of peasants and 
people working in rural areas.168 The concern about voice in decision making 
arguably applies across—without being necessarily limited to—the wide 
spectrum of issues the U.N. Declaration explicitly addresses, including the 
above-mentioned provisions dealing with control over land and natural re-
sources. 
On one level, the normative contours of the U.N. Declaration reflect an 
attempt to translate the implications of internationally recognized human 
rights to the specific circumstances of peasants and other people working in 
rural areas. Indeed, the preamble of the Declaration explicitly refers to several 
key international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights and a number of treaties and soft-law instruments, re-
affirming important elements of the international human rights law acquis, 
such as the universality, indivisibility, interrelatedness, and interdependence 
of all human rights.169 
However, this brief discussion of a few illustrative provisions exemplifies 
how the Declaration departs in significant ways from established human rights 
instruments. In effect, its cumulative provisions sustain a “right to produce 
food” that differs from the prevalent emphasis on food access and consump-
tion that characterizes, for example, much international jurisprudence on the 
right to adequate food.170 
This “right to produce” emerges from the Declaration’s specific provisions 
dealing with control over land, seeds, and the means of production, along with 
the place of small-scale rural producers in agricultural value chains, discussed 
above. But it also emerges, in more general terms, from the emphasis the Dec-
laration places on the value of work, which is reflected in the very title of the 
document (referring to people working in rural areas), in the Declaration’s 
definitional provisions (as discussed, peasants are defined by their reliance on 
family or household labour171), and in the substantive parts of the 
 
power imbalances between different parties and ensuring active, free, ef-
fective, meaningful and informed participation of individuals and groups 
in associated decision-making processes. 
Id. at art. 2, ¶ 3. 
 168 Id. at art. 10. 
 169 Id. at preamble, ¶¶ 2–5. 
 170 Edelman & James, supra note 134, at 85. However, the link between the right to food 
and agrarian reform has long been recognized. See, e.g., International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 11, ¶ 2, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. The U.N. 
Declaration also affirms the right to adequate food and to be free from hunger, which is 
defined in terms of “physical and economic access at all times to sufficient and adequate 
food,” but which also explicitly includes the “right to produce food.” G.A. Res. 73/165, 
supra note 9, at art. 15. 
 171 The Declaration applies to persons engaged in broadly defined agricultural activities, 
such as “artisanal or small-scale agriculture, crop planting, livestock raising, pastoralism, 
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Declaration.172 More than establishing safety nets for secure access to basic 
goods such as food and housing, the U.N. Declaration affirms the agency of 
peasants and rural people in the face of the often inequitable economic rela-
tions that affect production and trading. 
These departures in human rights configurations partly correlate to differ-
ences between diverse ideational and normative paradigms of agriculture and 
food systems. Crudely put, existing human rights instruments are broadly con-
sistent with the concept of food security, which also provides the basis for the 
normative and operational activities of the specialized agencies, funds and 
programs of the United Nations system that have explicit institutional man-
dates for food and agriculture. In contrast, the overall framing of the U.N. 
Declaration correlates more closely with the public advocacy agrarian move-
ments that have long operated around the notion of food sovereignty, which 
emphasises local control over agricultural production and food systems.173 
While the U.N. Declaration ultimately falls short of affirming a full-fledged 
right to food sovereignty, it does articulate its key elements within the struc-
ture of the rights it recognizes, and it asserts that “[p]easants and other people 
working in rural areas have the right to determine their own food and agricul-
ture systems, recognized by many States and regions as the right to food sov-
ereignty.”174 
Despite the significant textual differences that exist between the Via Cam-
pesina and U.N. Declarations, many of the novel human rights configurations 
embodied in the U.N. Declaration are partly rooted in concepts that were orig-
inally developed in the Via Campesina Declaration. For example, the Via 
Campesina Declaration contains provisions on the “right to land and terri-
tory,” the “right to seeds” and the “right to information.”175 While some other 
provisions of the Via Campesina Declaration have no full equivalents in the 
U.N. Declaration,176 this trajectory of normative development highlights the 
role of social movements in the development of international instruments, and 
 
fishing, forestry, hunting or gathering, and handicrafts related to agriculture.” G.A. Res. 
73/165, supra note 9, at art. 1, ¶ 2. 
 172 See, e.g., id. at art. 13. 
 173 MICHAEL WINDFUHR & JENNIE JONSÉN, FOOD SOVEREIGNTY: TOWARDS DEMOCRACY 
IN LOCALIZED FOOD SYSTEMS 13 (2005); Olivier de Schutter, Food Sovereignty a Critical 
Dialogue, TRANSNATIONAL INST. (Feb. 26, 2014), https://www.tni.org/en/article/olivier-de 
-schutter-food-sovereignty-a-critical-dialogue. For an articulation of food sovereignty, see 
Nyleni Declaration, FORUM ON FOOD SOVEREIGNTY (2007), https://nyeleni.org/IMG/pdf/D 
eclNyeleni-en.pdf and the commentary in Claeys, supra note 142, at 454–58. 
 174 G.A. Res. 73/165, supra note 9, at art. 8, ¶ 4; see also id. at art. 15, ¶5; id. at preamble, 
¶ 24. 
 175 LA VIA CAMPESINA, supra note 138, at arts. IV–V, VII. 
 176 For example, the “right to obtain funds from the State to develop agriculture.” Id. at 
art. VI, ¶ 1. 
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the relevance of a bottom-up perspective to interrogating the place of human 
rights in social justice struggles.177 
 
D. Preliminary Appraisal 
 
As with the international jurisprudence on indigenous peoples’ rights, the 
development and adoption of the U.N. Declaration has raised multifaceted is-
sues that interrogate the interface between human rights and social justice. In 
building on advocacy led by transnational social movements, and on concepts 
and even texts developed by those movements prior to the institutionalized 
inter-governmental process, the U.N. Declaration presents the distinctive con-
tours of international (soft) law making from the bottom up.178 And while 
global advocacy translating grassroots-level social justice demands into inter-
national human rights claims has often relied on “intermediaries” such as non-
governmental human rights organizations, in this case a transnational peasant 
movement representing millions of rural people directly led the advocacy 
from local to global levels—with NGOs and engaged academics characterized 
as primarily providing technical and logistical support.179 These reconfigured 
roles of the movements and their allies outline a different approach to agency 
and representation in international policy spaces, and to channelling advocacy 
from local to global arenas. 
Substantively, the text of the U.N. Declaration departs from established 
human rights approaches and establishes a strong relation between social jus-
tice claims and human rights norms. This relation is reflected, for example, in 
the emphasis the Declaration places on collective rights, on control over the 
means of production and agricultural value chains, on the intimate connection 
many rural people experience with their land and resources, and on the place 
of work as a source of social identity. The provisions of the Declaration that 
deal with control over land, seeds, and market systems embody a challenge to 
prevailing economic structures, and their full implementation would change 
the way agriculture and food systems are presently organised.   
This does not mean that questions have not been asked about the real 
emancipatory potential of some of the Declaration’s provisions, and diverse 
ideational matrices appear to coexist in the tapestry of the Declaration. Critical 
analyses have highlighted internal tensions within the text, pointing to some 
provisions that could indirectly reinforce, or at least presuppose and 
 
 177 On social movements and international law, see Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Counter-
Hegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human Rights and Development as a Third 
World Strategy, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 767 (2006). For a discussion of bottom-up perspec-
tives in international human rights law, see Basak Bagalayan, Searching for Human Rights 
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ternational Law, 36 NORDIC J. HUM. RTS. 371 (2018). 
 178 See generally Rajagopal, supra note 177. 
 179 Claeys, supra note 142, at 394–97. 
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recognize, features of prevailing economic ordering.180 For example, the Dec-
laration conditions the commercial exploitation of resources on which peas-
ants depend to the conduct of impact assessments, to good-faith consultation 
and to “fair and equitable” benefit sharing.181 Seemingly inspired to the inter-
national jurisprudence on indigenous peoples’ right to collective property, 
which as discussed was primarily developed in a reactive rather than consti-
tutive mode, these requirements are ultimately consistent with the penetration 
of commercial forms of production—so long as the specific conditions set are 
complied with. 
Further, institutionalisation may raise new challenges for a process that has 
so far relied on social movements’ agency. As a soft-law instrument, the U.N. 
Declaration will undoubtedly require continued public advocacy if its provi-
sions are to have any follow-through. However, the existence of an interna-
tionally negotiated normative text establishes authoritative parameters the in-
terpretation of which is no longer under the movements’ exclusive control, 
making the concepts, and the norms, more vulnerable to reinterpretation and 
possibly co-option. 
From a sociological perspective, the notion of peasantry has formed the 
object of extensive debates,182 both scholarly and activist, stemming from the 
considerable diversity of contexts, from the social differentiation that typi-
cally exists in rural areas, of the blurred lines between rural and urban worlds, 
and from overlapping and often shifting registers of social identity.183 In ad-
dition, how the Declaration will be used and implemented in practice, includ-
ing in national policy contexts, remains to be seen, and its non-binding nature 
would be expected to reduce its effectiveness in addressing entrenched socio-
economic injustices, including those that are rooted in imbalances within hard 
law.184 
Overall, however, there is little doubt that the adoption of the U.N. Decla-
ration constitutes an important milestone in the appropriation of human rights 
in the context of social justice struggles. This milestone offers a reminder that 
the catalogue of internationally recognized human rights is the product of 
 
 180 Margot E. Salomon, Nihilists, Pragmatists and Peasants: A Dispatch on Contradic-
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historically determined negotiation processes,185 that the configuration of hu-
man rights may significantly depart from the traditional liberal canon, and that 
human rights can provide arenas for activists to seek to renegotiate important 
aspects of socio-economic ordering. 
V. DISCUSSION 
A. Human Rights: Intellectual Histories, Legal Configurations, and Social 
Practices 
 
Critiques of human rights have traction because they identify real chal-
lenges. They also raise deeper questions about how ideas are developed, re-
negotiated and mobilized to inform action and sustain change. While ex-
tremely different in the legal concepts they deploy, the socio-political 
trajectories they embody, and the “reactive” and “constitutive” strategies they 
pursue, the two case studies explored in this article exemplify efforts to mo-
bilize human rights for social justice advocacy. Both reflect significant 
“wins,” whether in the form of public interest litigation or international (soft) 
law making. Yet both also beg difficult questions about the real scale of the 
advances made, and whether these advances can ultimately transform socio-
economic relations. 
The issue is not just that it is difficult for social actors to secure interna-
tional judgments or declarations, or to properly enforce or implement them 
once they have been obtained, particularly in the face of powerful vested in-
terests. The more probing question is whether even a properly implemented 
ruling or instrument would meaningfully reshape socio-economic ordering. 
Taken alone, a few judgments do not reverse the long history of mass dispos-
session affecting indigenous lands, and an international soft-law instrument 
does not alter entrenched patterns of land ownership, the international protec-
tion of intellectual property rights affecting the governance of seed systems, 
or the structure of agricultural value chains. By resorting to the instruments of 
positive law, social actors must translate their demands into conceptual cate-
gories—such as the right to property—that are associated with dominant eco-
nomic and political organization. 
In harnessing such hegemonic concepts in counter-hegemonic terms,186 
and in locating social justice advocacy within institutionalized human rights 
processes, strategies to “juridify” inherently political disputes must operate 
“within the system.” They may entail advocated-for and even actually 
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observed reforms, as illustrated by the jurisprudential reconfiguration of the 
right to property in the light of legal categories that resonate with indigenous 
conceptions. But they do not necessarily challenge the foundational parame-
ters of the system. Indeed, the mobilizing and even the reconfiguring ulti-
mately rest on the acceptance of the very state-centric international system of 
control over natural resources and development pathways that is instrumental 
to advancing commercial modes of production and to the dispossession of 
peasants and indigenous peoples in many parts of the world. While the two 
case studies illustrate bottom-up agency by indigenous and agrarian move-
ments, states played important roles in both, whether as bearers of human 
rights obligations and respondents in human rights litigation, or as negotiators 
and adopters of international soft law. 
While the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants exempli-
fies radical departures from the established human rights canon, crystallizing 
concepts into legal texts and subjecting them to the techniques of legal inter-
pretation can inherently limit the emancipatory potential of the rights at play. 
As regional human rights institutions have expressly acknowledged, from a 
legal standpoint, even duly recognized and protected collective rights to nat-
ural resources can be overridden by measures taken in the exercise of state 
sovereignty, so long as those measures comply with the safeguards established 
by international law. In fact, there are questions as to whether, in articulating 
demands through legal notions that are so deeply implicated with the status 
quo, advocacy strategies may become more vulnerable to capture—for exam-
ple, with contestation framed in property terms paving the way to processes, 
such as land demarcation and registration, that could ultimately compound the 
commodification of natural resource relations. There are also questions as to 
whether the disconnections between the normative and the experienced, and 
between the law in the books and in practice, might create expectations that 
are inevitably difficult to meet, and thus cause frustration and demoralization 
among social actors, and possibly short-circuit relations that could have sus-
tained alternative empowerment pathways. 
However, the use of internationally recognized human rights in discursive 
strategies and social processes can transcend the juristic limitations of the le-
gal concepts at play. In both case studies, human rights language and pro-
cesses are embedded in wider public mobilization, with institutionalized pro-
ceedings (court litigation, inter-governmental negotiations) being sustained 
by, and sustaining, social and discursive practices. While mutually reinforc-
ing, legal actions and social practices may reflect distinctive ways to concep-
tualise and mobilize human rights, and the intersections between the two can 
affect both jurisprudential and material outcomes. 
Indeed, where activists appropriate human rights to catalyse public mobi-
lization, the scope of the resulting action is not necessarily restricted to the 
perimeter delineated by jurisprudential interpretations of international human 
rights law. The experience of the Sawhoyamaxa community occupying its 
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traditional lands now under commercial operations exemplifies how social ac-
tors can shift registers—moving from legal proceedings to direct action—in 
different times and places, while also using the human rights register to legit-
imize land occupations that would otherwise contravene positive law. 
In these regards, any assessments of the emancipatory potential of human 
rights in social justice struggles cannot be limited to a discussion of the ways 
in which those rights have been construed by drafters, tribunals and jurists, or 
of the intellectual origins and cultural matrices that have affected the historical 
development of human rights law. While legal experts will be primarily con-
cerned with the techniques of legal drafting and interpretation, emancipatory 
potential is a function of a wider range of socio-political as well as juridical 
variables. 
Therefore, those assessments would also need to consider how human 
rights are appropriated in socio-political arenas, where discursive practices 
may create ruptures with established ideational matrices and departures from 
the traditional canons of juristic interpretation. Considering these practices 
would require broadening the methods of inquiry to pursue a more grounded 
understanding of rights in their social context. To different extents and in dif-
ferent ways, both the indigenous rights jurisprudence and the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Peasants indicate that this “activist” use of human 
rights can ultimately sustain evolutions in normative configurations, via juris-
prudential interpretations and international (soft) law making, thereby inter-
secting with, and cross-fertilizing, the traditional purview of doctrinal anal-
yses. 
In these respects, the two case studies call for expanding the horizons of 
current debates about the relation between human rights and social justice. 
While public debates have often focused on the work of mainstream human 
rights organizations based in the global North, both examples highlight the 
prominent role that social movements that are at least partly located in the 
global South—including actors that do not primarily identify themselves as 
human rights organizations—have played in developing distinctive modes to 
invoke and reshape human rights in pursuit of social justice. 
 
B. From Human Rights Frameworks to Rights-Claiming as a Practice of 
Contestation 
 
This broadening of the horizon of inquiry adds new insights to existing 
debates and nuances to some recurring themes in the critique of rights. For 
example, while some of the critique pointed to the unwillingness or inability 
of human rights approaches to tackle economic inequality and wider social 
justice issues, in both case studies social actors have established human rights 
as a site for contesting aspects of socio-economic ordering, even though ulti-
mately with mixed practical results. 
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While some scholarly work has associated human rights with meeting 
“basic needs” through a minimum level of access to certain goods and ser-
vices,187 in both case studies advocacy is about recognition, voice, and histor-
ical redress, as much as it is about ensuring that material needs are met. This 
circumstance offers a reminder that realising human rights is ultimately about 
increasing control over an individual’s or group’s life, which may require 
transformational change in social, economic and political structures. This per-
spective aligns with shifts in public understanding of poverty and deprivation, 
which for a long time were framed primarily if not exclusively in terms of 
access to material goods, and are now widely recognized to be multi-dimen-
sional phenomena that can be underpinned by marginalization and lack of 
voice, as well as low incomes.188   
The emphasis that agrarian and indigenous peoples’ movements have 
placed on collective rights also questions assumptions about the supposedly 
inherently individualistic and individualising nature of human rights. Further, 
while much public debate on the interface between human rights and social 
justice has focused on relations within national polities, or in relations among 
states (e.g., in connection with demands for a New International Economic 
Order), the case studies illustrate how social movements have also wielded 
human rights to contest the transnational arrangements that underpin the con-
temporary global economy. 
This harnessing of human rights by indigenous and agrarian movements 
illustrates the need to re-center the debates about the emancipatory potential 
of human rights from institutionalized human rights actors and frameworks to 
rights-claiming as a practice of contestation. In this perspective, invoking hu-
man rights may constitute a channel for social actors to articulate a rupture 
with aspects of socio-political ordering,189 as much as a juridical avenue for 
producing legally enforceable outcomes to change a given material situation. 
Human rights are therefore viewed as both vehicles and outcomes of political 
struggle, and their development is, at least in part, the story of how social 
actors—including groups that do not primarily define their institutional man-
dates in human rights terms—have appropriated rights language and instru-
ments to advance their agendas. 
This perspective outlines a different set of dimensions in the practice of 
human rights, one where legal forms are embedded in social processes and 
where human rights are advanced, at least in part, through the vision, resolve 
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and action of social groups. In addition, the import and effectiveness of rights-
claiming are to be assessed not only in terms of judicial, legislative, or even 
material outcomes, but also in relation to the ways in which advocacy can use 
human rights to legitimize counter-hegemonic worldviews and catalyse col-
lective action.190 
These considerations apply in different ways to reactive and constitutive 
strategies, and failure to disaggregate the discussion can lead to analytical 
confusion. In reactive modes, the main concern may be about addressing a 
specific situation or pattern of human rights abuse. In many situations, this 
reactive rights-claiming will reflect a principled position that fundamentally 
espouses the framing of the human rights being invoked. But recourse to hu-
man rights in reactive mode can also be instrumental and even opportunistic. 
It can be a vehicle for achieving certain goals, even if activating rights pro-
cesses may require accepting normative or juridical configurations, such as 
the right to property, that contrast with the ultimate vision of relevant social 
actors, or that seem removed from the daily realities those actors experience. 
Rather than inevitably revealing limited ambition in the underlying social 
change agendas, these circumstances may reflect pragmatic tactical choices 
driven by immediate imperatives, such as the need to anchor advocacy to legal 
rights that are formally recognized and effectively protected by applicable 
positive law. 
In constitutive modes, on the other hand, recourse to human rights may 
have more foundational and normative connotations, there may be more space 
for more explicit ruptures with prevailing juridical arrangements. This does 
not necessarily mean that the substantive social justice demands are them-
selves qualitatively more radical than in reactive modes, and if the advocacy 
translates into formalised inter-governmental processes it may have to come 
to terms with the compromises that tend to characterise international negotia-
tions and law making. But when articulating social justice demands in consti-
tutive human rights modes, advocates are less constrained by established hu-
man rights forms, and they may enjoy greater latitude in aligning human rights 
concepts with their own social justice goals. 
 
C. Rights-Claiming in Contested Socio-Political Terrains 
 
The limitations in the material outcomes of both reactive and constitutive 
strategies, discussed above, provide a cautionary tale about the real difference 
human rights can make in hotly contested socio-political terrains. However, 
they also reflect the fact that rights-claiming can get in the way of national 
development models and of transnational economic relations premised on 
large-scale resource exploitation, and it can upset powerful interests from lo-
cal to global levels. 
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The political backlashes the Inter-American Court cases triggered in sev-
eral Latin American countries, and the repression many human rights defend-
ers have suffered for their advocacy in the face of agribusiness and extractive 
industry projects worldwide, particularly in the context of shrinking political 
spaces,191 are a reminder of the complex political economies of vested inter-
ests and power relations that rights-claiming may be confronted with. In such 
political economy contexts, social justice advocacy—whether or not based on 
human rights—can meet stiff and often brutal opposition, change is an inevi-
tably slow and difficult process, and the ultimate outcomes may differ consid-
erably from those advocated for. 
The association between rights-claiming and socio-political contestation is 
also apparent on the ideational plane. Both case studies illustrate how rights-
claiming can situate struggles in the realm of ideas, as much as in political and 
economic organization, and seek to subvert the cultural subjugation that is 
often associated with socio-political marginalization. Social movements’ re-
claiming the notion of “peasants,” their asserting the intimate connection be-
tween people and land, and their aiming to shift public narratives about devel-
opment paradigms all challenge ingrained prejudices about the 
“backwardness,” or “modernity,” of different systems of livelihoods and be-
liefs, and of different forms of natural resource use. Such prejudices underpin 
the structural discrimination that peasants and indigenous peoples experience 
in many legal systems,192 so the ideational plane intersects with the juristic 
and material dimensions. 
On these ideological battlegrounds, different conceptions of human rights 
can come directly into contest—for example, where the commercial actors 
that resist indigenous peoples’ land restitution claims invoke the right to prop-
erty to protect their own assets. These situations can expose tensions between 
different conceptions of the right to property—such as those premised on a 
deeply felt socio-cultural bond between people and land, and those that em-
phasise security of market transactions and the place of land in productive 
activities. The diverse ideational matrices of human rights can coexist within 
the same jurisprudential approach or legal instrument. For instance, the no-
tions of prior consultation and benefit sharing, developed by the Inter-Amer-
ican Court in reactive mode, could ultimately operate in ways that are coex-
tensive with extractivist models. In an example of apparent norm diffusion, 
these notions penetrated the formulation of a new human rights instrument 
advocated for in constitutive terms, namely the U.N. Declaration on the Rights 
of Peasants, which in other respects embodies a more fundamental departure 
from prevailing human rights practices. 
These considerations point to the impossibility of interrogating the human 
rights and social justice interface in connection with an encompassing and 
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undifferentiated human rights “project,” or “movement,” as doing this would 
obscure the contested and evolving nature of human rights, and the different 
and often contrasting strands of human rights thought and action. Such an en-
compassing and undifferentiated framing risks marginalising the practices and 
the voices of certain actors, particularly those located at the grassroots, in ge-
ographic and economic global peripheries, or at the fringes of the human 
rights “movement.” 
Critique is the engine of change, so it is essential that social justice (and 
human rights) thinkers and practitioners continuously interrogate their as-
sumptions and approaches and, where necessary, reorient them accordingly. 
Critiques of rights both old and new have exposed human rights’ limitations—
whether structural or contingent—in promoting more just socio-economic re-
lations. They have established a challenge for advocates to develop ever more 
ambitious and effective human rights practices, and to explore alternative or 
complementary strategies to comprehensively address social justice chal-
lenges. At the same time, there is a need to broaden current debates to more 
plural perspectives that recognize the diversity of human rights actors, agen-
das, arenas and approaches, and to open spaces for more fully engaging with 
the practices of actors located outside the human rights mainstream. By seek-
ing to understand how diverse social actors have appropriated and reimagined 
human rights from the bottom up, it might become possible to ask different 
questions about whether and how human rights can sustain emancipatory ac-
tion. 
 
